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PREFACE
The present thesis is concerned primarily with the
words Seneca uses to specifly his Supreme Being.
pose in view it was

n~cessary

With this pur-

to use at very frequent intervals,

especially in Chapter Four, quotations from Seneca's works.

To

retain the Latin feeling and shades of mefu'1.L"g contained in the
Latin wording Seneca's direct words were inserted as much as
possible.

This was done even within the course of an English

sentence when it was felt the Latin flavor would be lost in the
transfer to the English.

Also, since Seneca's works were used

very freely, abbreviations of the various titles were used in
the many footnotes.

To assist the reader who might not be well

acquainted with Seneca's works we h.ereby insert a key to the
essays and letters employed in this thesis.
Ad Helviam de Consolatione
Ad Marciam de Consolatione
Ad Polybium de Consolatione
De Beneficiis
De Brevitate Vitae
De Clementia
De Constantia Sapientis
De Ira
De Otio Sapientis
De Providentia
De Vita Beata
Epistulae Morales
Quaestiones Naturales

Ad Helv.
Ad Marc.
Ad Polyb.
De Ben.
De Brev. V.
De Clem.
De Constant.
De Ira
De Otio
De Prov.
De V. B.
Ep. Mor.
Quaest. Nat.
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CHAPTER I
THE CASE PRESENTED
The life and -writings of Lucj_us Annaeus Seneca have
interested, puzzled, and intrigued mankind all during his life
and ever since

~is

death.

There certainly was no philosopher

of his period who could equal him in seriousness of thought and
no statesman who had run the gamut of success and failure in
public office and imperial favor more completely than he.
As a philosopher Seneca launched out into no unplumbed
depths of metaphysics or ethics.

His was the desire to utilize

principles already recognized and to instil in men a love of
philosophy and the wisdom for which it taught men to strive.
For him Philosophy was simply an attempt to reach wisdom,l
which he called the Sumnru.m Bonum of the human mind.

And the

Summum Bonum viewed practically for him was quod honestum ~.2
This thought recurs again and again as the theme around which
all his letters and philosophical essays are centered.

It must

be admitted that it was a theme well worthy of any man's pen.
And to say that Seneca ably fulfilled the task he set for himself would be to belabor the obvious.
1

2

Richard Gummere, ed. and transl., Seneca: E~istulae
Morales, London, William Heinemann, 1934, 8 .4 . ·

Ep. Mor.

71.4

2

However, as Tacitus was to remark some years later, in
those days of the Empire it was better to be without ability
than to come to the attention of the ruler.

And Seneca was one

who by the grace of his talents and the entangling web of circumstances only too often and forcibly came under the scheming
eye of a Caligula or a Nero.

It is not our intention to vin-

dicate Seneca's character as Tacitus appears to do or to drop
sly hints of adultery or usury as Dio Cassius 3 and Juvenal4 intend.

Seneca's life may have stood in open contradiction to

his elevated doctrine.

Still, J. Wight Duff for one, while

giving us a rather exhaustive list of Seneca's supposed weaknesses and improprieties, seems to think that he is innocent.
The story of improper relations with Julia so obviously served
Messalina's machinations that it cannot be accepted as incontrovertible fact, while the suggestion of an amour with Agrippina is even more incredible. That Seneca was privy to deaths
of Claudius, of Britannicus and of Agrippina was whispered and
repeated, but the ru~ours can be neither proved or disproved.
His weak condonation of such deeds very naturally subjects him
to suspicion. That he advocated the contempt of wealth and yet
accumulated it, is not to be gainsaid; even so, and granted
that he lent money on interest, we are not bound to believe
Dio's statement that Seneca caused an insurrection in Britain
by suddenly calling in the huge sum of forty million sesterces.5
However, all these things, even though they were true, would
not lessen the importance or value of his thoughts and teachings.

For the "power of Seneca as a moral teacher has, with

some reservations, been recognized by all the ages since his
3
4
5

Edward Cary, ed. and transl., Dio Cassius: Roman History,
London, William Heinemann, 192~61.10
Charles Anthon, ed., The Satires of Juvenal and Persius,
New York, Harper Bros:;-1879, 8.2~
--J. Wight Duff, A Literart History of Rome in the Silver Age,
New York, Chas.-Scribner s Sons, 1~5~4-----

3

time.n6

And "Seneca, like Tacitus, has a remarkable power of

moral diagnosis."?
that we seek.

It is Seneca the teacher of moral doctrine

It matters not whether this belief coincides

with his deeds.

Besides, many Christians under more favorable

circumstances and with far greater graces have failed to maintain the standard of life that they by their very name profess
to follow.
One historian abstracts for a moment from the actual
content of Seneca's doctrine and the conduct of his life just
to consider r1im as the completest specimen of the professed
philosopher of antiquity.
He was neither a statesman who indulged in moral speculation,
like Cicero, nor a private citizen who detached himself, like
Epicurus or Zeno, from the ordinary duties of life, to devote
himself to the pursuit of abst~act truth. To teach and preach
philosophy in writing, in talking, in his daily life and conversation, was, indeed, the main object he professed; but he
regarded all public careers as practical developments of moral
science, and plumed himself on showing that thought may in
every case be combined with action.8
Seneca, therefore, as this man well states, aims "to teach and
preach philosophy."

Throughout the course of his essays and

letters he does not let himself or his reader forget the end he
has in mind.

This is one point in which Seneca does maintain

the greatest coherency and consistency.

It mattered not

whether he spoke De Providentia or Ad Helviam de Consolatione.
6
7
8

Samuel Dill, Roman Society From Nero to Marcus Aurelius,
London, Macmillan and Co. , 'mL>, ...,-- Dill, 9
Charles Merivale, History of the Romans under the Empire,
New York, Longmans Green
TIC:, 1904, 8.269

ana
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The general aim of the essay and the tenor of the doctrine remained the same.

His "secundum naturam vi vere" and "ad illius

legem exemplumque formari sapientia est"9 sum up his entire
philosophy.

And to this one idea he has held firm in each

succeeding essay.
Philosophy for Seneca was not an organized division of
investigation into cosmology, logic, and other philosophical
branches.

His philosophy was only ethics, the study of mor-

ality, quod honestum

~·

But yet, Seneca went far above the

level of honestum and turpe to ascend to the height of perfection and asceticism.

It might sound strange to speak of an

ancient and pagan ascetic, but some have labelled Seneca just
that.

"Whatever may be thought of his excellencies. or defects

as a writer, or of the caricature and priggishness of the Stoic
sect, he was in his writings an earnest, a highly pretending,
and apparently a sincere advocate of ascetic severity.ttlO

And

in this special field of philosophy, in which he preordained
himself to labor under the aegis of Zeno, Seneca "was the principal ornament of Stoicism in his day, and a valuable instructor
of mankind." 11
Mention has been made on several occasions, sometimes
9
10
11

John W. Basore, ed. and transl., Seneca: Moral Essays ,LONDON, William Heinemann, 1928, De Vita Beata 3.2
Benjamin H. Malkin, Classical Dis~itions, London, Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, Brown,· an Green, 1825, 295
Malkin, 296

~··
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directly, sometimes implicitly, that Seneca followed the Stoic
doctrines.
tem'~

Stoicism, it is surely plain, was the general "sys-

followed by Seneca, but whether he was consistent with this

plan as proposed by Zeno, and advanced by Cleanthes and Chrysippus in his concept of a Supreme Being, is just the point
under discussion in this thesis.

It is well known that many

writers, judging superficially from Seneca's general aim of

~lfo<.fh:..:CX. and the supremacy of Reason over Fate, which are decidedly Stoic proposals, wish to classify him immediately and
in all things as a Stoic.

Others, however, seeing such beau-

tiful expressions as "cogitas quanta nobis tribuerit parens
noster"l2 and "patrium deus habet adversus bonos viros animum
et illos fortiter amatttl3 contend that Seneca has deserted the
camp of Stoicism for the Christian concept of God.
The solution, however, is not quite this simple.

First

of all, Seneca is not expounding or elaborating a Stoic "system"
of philosophy.

This would be impossible, for the Stoics

really had no "system" of subjects or doctrines as we know them
today.

Systems were a subjective arrangement of later date.

Zeno gave lectures and writings on a physical theory of the
universe.

His Greek followers, Cleanthes and Chrysippus, took

various phases of these doctrines and elaborated them.

Cleanthes

took physics and Chrysippus, because of his many controversies,
12
13

De Ben. 1.29.3
De Prov. 2.6
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turned to the study of logic.

Seneca, in turn, never proposed

to classify or analyze the works of these men.
forte was to be ethics.

His special

And, since ethics presupposes meta-

physics, he also includes passing phases of this branch of
philosophy in essays and letters.

No Stoic, not even Epictetus

and Marcus Aurelius at later dates, gave us complete expositions
of a "system," but only lectures on general topics or jottings
of random ideas.

This lack of system is extremely unfortunate;

still, says one man "as it was the aim of the Stoics to form
men and not merely to train reasoners or to produce orators,
that determined their mode of procedure.ttl4
Another point that must be considered is Seneca's incoherency.

George A. Simcox in his History of Latin Literature

says: "He never succeeds in having a plan in any of his larger
works; he is at the mercy of the association of ideas and of
the way in which one topic suggests another.ttl5
dent in the De Beneficiis and the De Ira.

This is evi-

After speaking of

the ingratitude manifested by those who forget past benefits in
the early part of Book Three of the De Beneficiis Seneca. gets
the thought that this is an odious vice and so perhaps should
not go unpunished.

This leads him to expatiate on various

charges brought against cities and on the procedure of a law
14
15

L. Davidson, The Stoic Creed, Edinburgh, T. Clark,
1907, 32
--George A. Simcox, A Histor~ of Latin Literature, New York,
Harper and Bros., 1906, 2.
W~lliam

7

court.

At the outset of Book Two of the De Ira Seneca says

that in this early section "quaerimus enim ira utrum judicio an
impetu incipiat,t• 16 but in reality he tells how virtue considers
anger reprehensible and how unworthy of the wise man it is to
sink to this level.

This same fault also makes for greater con-

fusion in the present discussion, since Seneca nowhere in his
writings takes time to explain in detail to what he has reference when, for instance, in the

~

.2!!£

deses opus suum spectet an tractet.nl7

he asks "qui sit deus;
From this important

idea, which he views quite contemptuously, as the context shows,
Seneca then passes on without any further elaboration of what
might have been a topic sentence.
A third difficulty has rendered it almost impossible
for certain scholars to make any decision on such technical
points as Seneca's concept of God.

For, as Cruttwell puts it,

like all the other thinkers of the time he cared nothing for
of opinion, everything for impressiveness of application. He was Stoic, Platonist, Epicurean, as often as it
suited him to employ their principles to enforce a moral
lesson.l8

cons~ency

And, as another author remarks, "Seneca made a sort of amalgamation of the moralities of Zeno and Epicurus; it was true
that one proceeded from idealism and the other from materialism,
but what did it matter~ttl9
16
17
18

A third states that he "contra-

De Ira 2.1.1

De Otio 4.2
Charles T. Cruttwell, A Histor' of Roman Literature, London, Chas. Griffin and-Co. IS '7, 38'7
19 Albert Grenier, The Roman Spirit, New York, Alfred A. Knopf,
926 398
..

8

dieted himself within the range of the same treatise.tt 20
Probably the most patent example of this fault is Seneca's
vigorous attack against the Stoical doctrine that the wise man
will take part in the government of the state.

Seneca indicates

that Zeno, to mention only one, remained a private teacher all
his life.

Therefore, if Zeno was consistent, he had intended

his teaching of participation in civil life in some other sense,
or attached some condition to it.

But all this, of course,

Seneca did not even mention until he himself, beginn;ng to fear
for his life, desired to withdraw from public life.
Therefore, the lack of system, incoherency, and inconsistency in Seneca should prevent one from falling into the
mistake of certain investigators who believe the problem extremely simple or just non-existent.

For them a certain set of

quotable expressions sound exactly like St. Paul or, ~ contra,
similar to the most complete Stoic.

Thus, they are easily led

to believe that this or that was Seneca's idea of God.

The

very same difficulties, however, have kept most men from giving
any opinion on this subject at all.

This is, at least, a safe

~

procedure.

One writer, Samuel Dill, as shall be seen in a

later chapter, declares the god of Seneca possesses a spiritual
nature in one place and a pantheistic existence on the very
following page.
20

Duff, 207

But he is unique in that.

Most men, in re-

9

ferring to the god of Seneca hardly go beyond expressing certain
resemblances to Christian and to Stoic concepts.

They have don

much in carrying their investigations as far as they have and
"the jungle of literature which has grown up around Seneca testifies to the manifold inquiries stimulated by his personality
and works.n21

Still, even though "his influence makes him one

of the most prominent figures in the history of letters"22 we
are yet seeking tne clarification of many statements in his
works.

Seneca's idea of God is one of these problems.
The present study is an attempt to reach a satisfactory

answer to the question, "'i'lhat did Seneca mean by the many terms
he used to signify a Supreme Being?"

In other words, "What is

God for Seneca?"
This question is one exceedingly worthy of research on
various scores.

Seneca has been termed a great teacher, philo-

sopher, and writer.

Because of his re_putation'and position it

is good to see his beliefs on the basis of erudition alone.
But an even more important reason was Seneca's influence during
his own lifetime and his reputation throughout the centuries.
Being a man who was intimately connected with the emperors and
on the political scene for many years, he very naturally spread
his ideas to a large number of the ruling class and through
them to the private citizens.
21
22

Duff, 196-7
Duff, 197

Just how much Seneca's teachings

10
counteracted or assisted the rising Christianity is another
question, but there can be no doubt that the two doctrines of
Stoicism and Christianity met one another within the boundaries
of Rome.

St. Paul's

mately 57 A.D. and

Epistle!£~

t~is

Romans was sent in approxi-

fact alone indicates that a goodly

number of Christians were then abiding in the capital of the
world.
Be that as it may, Seneca's position, personal contacts, and writings made him and his utterances of wide importance both in his day and ours.

Tacitus, Dio Cassius, Juvenal,

Martial all voice different reactions of the ancients while J.
Wight Duff's comments on the wealth of Senecan commentaries23
point out the impression Seneca has made upon medieval and
modern scholars alike.

It is obviously worthwhile then to

consider and weigh the most important concept any man could
have in the works of t:lis most important man.
Was Seneca's concept of a Supreme Ruler of the universe
the conventional pantheism or materialistic principle of the
preceding Stoics?

Or was it an idea that was altered by the

influence of Christianity into a spiritual, personal, loving
creator and guardian of men?

Or did Seneca so interwine and

mix his manner of speaking as to indicate that he himself had
no clear concept of God?
23

Duff, 197
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It is clear from Seneca's many references to the Epicureans, Pythagoreans, Cynics, and Stoics that his life and
learning had come under the influence of· these various schools
of philosophy.

To assist in discovering Seneca's owfi concept

of God it becomes necessary to consider the men from whom he
imbibed his doctrine and even those whom he claims he rejects
and anathematizes.

It will be easier then to classify him with

a eertain group or to find in what he disagrees with them.

Or

we can see how he constructs an amalgam of var:i_ous ideas to
satisfy his purpose of the moment.
Secondly, it is important to find what deductions
various selected classical scholars have arrived at after their
reading of Seneca's own words.

As has been expressed earlier,

these investigations, in most cases, consist merely of a few
words of explanation for a few select phrases from Seneca.
But even this is of some worth since it shows very plainly
either how little research has been done on this topic or how
difficult men have found its solution to be.

If little re-

search has been done, there is no reason why that situation
should continue.

If the solution is difficult, it is useful

to see why, and, if possible, to provide a suitable answer.

I~

any case the work will be profitable, for it will clarify the
extent of the studies already made and show the need of furthei
evidence and examination before any conclusive statement can
be issued.

12
Seneca's testimony itself, however, is the important
element.

His philosophical essays and letters give many re-

ferences to god, Nature, Fate, and Fortune.
these terms will signify t'.1e same thing.

In some instances

At other times not.

Frequently the language of Seneca equals that of any Christian,
as when he says: "plurima beneficia nos deus defert sine ape
recipiendi, quoniam nee ille conlato eget nee nos ei quidquam
conferre possumus.»24

But apparently he grovels just as low

in materialism in his statement: "mundua hie, qu.o nihil neque
majus neque ornatius rerum natura genui t. tt25

How then to

account for this and many other apparent contradictions?

That

question constitutes the heart of any study on the God of
Seneca.

Before any answer can be offered one must understand

Seneca's references to god and Fate in their contextual background, and then as weighed against Seneca's general philosophical "system" and the influence exerted on him.

All this

must urecede the fir1.al decision.
In each of the following chapters, then, we will determine:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

24
25

De Ben. 4.9.1
Ad Helv. 8.4

What others have said about Seneca's idea
of God;
vVha t influences were exerted upon Seneca;:
What Seneca himself had to say;
What we can conclude from the evidence presented.

~~----------------~
CHAPTER II
WHAT

O~BERS

SAY

In the actual study of Seneca much time and attention
have been devoted to breaking through the mere shell.of words
into the heart and mind of the author himself.

There are so

many points which puzzle one who is reading Seneca for the
first, or thetundredth, time that he is inclined to meditate on
the actual meaning various passages held for their author.
Then, after further investigation one must either confess that
he has found no answer or he will endeavor to list what he believes is the true interpretation of Seneca's words.

For,

the~

are so many practical applications in Seneca that each one
thinks himself privileged to give the true meaning concealed in
his words.
It is no wonder, therefore, that classical scholars in
each age find in Seneca something that demands their interest.
For some it is Seneca's life itself in relation to the political movements of the times.

Others wish to evaluate his mor-

ality according to the standards of his own doctrines.

Many

are attracted to the peculiarities of his literary style.

And

a host are halted by the more than passing similarity to the
Christian principles of life.

Whatever it is that draws men to

,..-·

r-------------------------------------------~~14~--

Seneca, he has become one of the more,widely discussed and debated about authors of the Silver Age.
All types of analysts are to be found in Senecan literature.

Numerous writers '1ave been drawn to give their opin-

ions of what Seneca's ideas on God really were.

The conclus-

ions they reached are many and varied, depending in large part
on the extent of their study.

To a lesser degree their answers

must hinge on their own cultural, philosophical, and religious
background, although an investigation of these will scarcely
enter into the scope of the present topic.

It is sufficient to

note that various answers have been given and conflicting conelusions reached by many who have touched on Seneca's concept
of the Supreme Being of the universe.
In studying the opinions offered by a dozen or more
classicists one finds three answers given on the essence of the
deity.

The first position held is one of initial and final

doubt; the second is the doctrine of Stoicism and materialism;
the last is that of Christianity and spirituality.
In his book, The Stoic Creed, William Davidson treats
the entire Stoic school from Zeno to Marcus Aurelius, with
greater stress placed on Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius.

First, he assumes that Seneca maintained all the Stoic

doctrines, and, secondly, he fails to state which one or what
)

group of the other writers held a certain opinion attributed to

~~------------~
15

the Stoics.

Nevertheless, in two passages in which special re-

ference is made to Seneca, Davidson admits he can come to no definite decision, for "whether the supreme providence is a living
personal God, or merely an impersonal principle, the course of
nature, or the universe itself, is very doubtful."l

Further on,

relying, no doubt, in part on Seneca's own admission that "nemo
novit deum,"2 he says~
Right well, for instance, does Seneca realize that it is not
possible for us to comprehend fully the power that made all
things, although we may discover him in part on every hand. On
two poj_nts alone is he perfectly assured - namely, THAT THERE
IS A GOD, AND THAT WE ARE rro ASCRIDE TO HIM ALL NlAJESTY AND
GOODNESS • 3
Faced with the all too many inconsistencies that appear on the
surface of Seneca's works, Davidson refuses to believe that
Seneca himself knew the ultima essentia of God.
Just a step beyond the state of doubt registered by
Davidson is the certainty of another scholar that one God does
exist.
It is of interest to note that Seneca makes his contribution to
the search for a satisfying monotheism; that he keeps alight
the torch kindled by Panaetius and tended by Posidonius, Varro,
and Cicero ••• Indeed, it may be said the most important advance
in theory made by Roman Stoics is to be found in the gradual
substitution of one god for the pantheistic materialism of Zeno
and his earlier Greek followers.~
This man calls it an important advance to come to the con1
2
3
4

Davidson, 214
Ep. Mor. 31.10
Davidson, 221
Hubert McNeill Poteat, "Some Reflections on Roman Philosophy," Classical Journal, 33.520

~~------------~
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elusion that one God exists.

His statement is true.

the nature of this one God is forgotten.

However,

And, in reality, it

seems difficult to see how one could arrive at the conclusion
titat there must be one God without understanding something more
of his nature.
In his mention of Seneca the Greek scholar, Caird, concurs in the generalities already offered.

His idea seems to be

that Seneca did not attempt to reach any ultimate answer, but
was satisfied to take for granted basic ethical principles and
the ultimate nature of reality.
The crude theories of Epicurus and Zeno as to the criterion of
truth, and as to the ultimate nature of reality, are in a distinctly lower key of speculation than the Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysic and dialectic. Still lower from a scientific, if not from a literary point of view, are the epigrammatic moralisings of Seneca, the aphoristic meditations of Marcus Aurelius, and practical sermons of Epictetus, in all of
which the theoretic basis of ethics is rather presupposed than
explained.5
Most authors, however, incline in varying degrees
toward the opinion that Seneca was possessed of Stoical tendencies.

Probably the weakest affirmation in that regard, al-

though quite symptomatic, is one that says nothing of the deity
in Seneca, but lists Seneca's dependence on the Stoic system.
Although Seneca feels very strongly that philosophy is to be
practical, and not a mere compendium of abstract truths, he is
always entangling himself in casuistry, for scruples grow up
fast when people insist on suppressing the strongest of their
natural impulses, and the artificial estimate of life on which
5

Edward Caird, The Evolution of Theolog~ in the Greek Philosophers, Glasgow, James MacLehese and ons,~04, 2.39-40

~·
~----------------------------------------------~
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'
.

the Stoics laid so much stress as a guide to right conduct required to be guarded by an immense apparatus of distinctions.
seneca distrusts his own wealmess too much to be independent;
though he is always fretting at the bondage of system, he never
emancipates his favorite conception of bona mens from the paradoxical trammels of Zeno and Chrysippus:o-- ---.
This quotation also indicates the problem experienced by other
students in determinj_ng any final judgment of Seneca's words
when it mentions Seneca as "always entangling himself in casuistry."
How much Seneca leans upon Stoic arguments is better
described by Ralph Stob.

He comes to certain conclusions, which,

though more revealing, are not very detailed.
stance is the fiery Logos.
two are identical.

"The primary sub-

This resides in God and man.

Man is God, and God is man.

The

Since the Stoic

has only an immanent God, it naturally follows that God and man
are one.

The teaching runs all through the Stoic writings.n7

Just what the nature of God and then of the "fiery Logos"is is
mentioned later on in the clause, "in view of the God-concept of
Stoicism which presents God only as immanent and then, too, impersonal and material. n8

Seneca, therefore, is presumed to be

a Stoic and to be following the general Stoic concept that God
is immanent, impersonal, and material.

Just what evidence there

was in Seneca to lead Stob to this opinion is not revealed.
Another writer also takes for granted that Seneca is a
6
7
8
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stoic, though admitting he does have a different tone to his
doctrines because he seems to imbibe something of the spirit of
other schools of philosophy.

"He(Seneca) was opposed to the

doctrines of his school in no important point; nevertheless,
his phllosophy breathes a somewhat different spirit from that
of the ancient Stoics.

He made use of other authorities than

the Stoics, especially the works of Epicurus.n9

Despite this

note of eclecticism "without contradicting the Stoic materialism and pantheism he(Seneca) laid special emphasis on the ethical features of the Stoic idea of God on which the belief in
providence was based.nlO

Therefore, according to this author,

Seneca concurred in the metaphysical concepts of the Stoics
concerning God, but paid little heed to this field of philosophic exploration.

His forte was ethics, hence his love for

further elaborating the benevolent side of God's nature.

There-

fore, we find many references to such attributes as mercy, kindness, generosity, and providence, but few to the essence of the
deity from whence they flow.
In a somewhat more elaborate treatment, Chief Ancient
Philosophies, Stoicism,

w.w.

Capes seems to be straining to

find soPe note of Christianity in what he claims to be the Stoi
al teachings of Seneca.

Capes is not even too sure that Seneca

is nothing more than an eclectic, for in a lengthy passage he
9

10

Eduard Zeller, Outlines of ~ History of Greek Philosophy,
New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1931, 267
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takes pains to show Seneca's tendency to borrow what pleased him
from philosophers of any school whatsoever.
Some of the most striking parallels to our religious thought belong, not to Seneca himself or to the system of philosophy which
he professed but to earlier schools and different thinkers from
whom he freely borrowed. We have already called attention to
this tendency, which was natural enough in that late age when
rigid exclusiveness was out of date and eclecticism had become
a ruling fashion. Thus the beautiful expressions to be found
in him about our Heavenly Father, from whom come all good and
uerfect gifts, whom we should try to imitate, that we may be
perfect like our Father ••• these and many others may be found in
Plato centuries before they gained a place, but not always a
harmonious setting, in the letters and dialogues of Seneca. In
the school of Pythagoras, which he followed in his youth, he
may have learnt to examine himself, as was his later practice,
to listen to the voice of conscience, and to confess the wrong
which he had done. From Epicurus, as we have seen, he borrowed
much, and among other sentiments that one, "the consciousness
of sin is the first step towards salvation,"(Ep. Mor. 28) on
which so much stress has been laid as an evidence of Scriptural
doctrine.ll
Still, for all his borrowing, Seneca was always a Stoic at
heart, says Capes.

"But there can be no doubt that Seneca ad-

hered without hesitation to the Stoic creed, and his reserves
and compromises belong more to his heart than to his head. 11 12
This statement is a trifle difficult to understand in view of
a further admission.

"We see, therefore, that in spite of all

his borrowed phrases of the school, there is little in Seneca's
own teaching of the hardness and coldness of the Stoical
school. ttl3

If Capes by this passage means to infer that Sen-

eca's teaching was not Stoical in essence as well as expression,
then he apparently is not clear in his own mind as to what sys11
12
13
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tem and doctrines Seneca was trying to follow.

It is more

likely, however, that Capes saw more in Seneca than his Christian manner of speaking, for he says: "Devotional language there
may be, indeed, to express the fervour of emotion, kindled by
the effort to pursue in thought the Absolute Being in all its
endless changes through the immensities of tim~ and space. ttl4
He wishes to stress the fact that an emotional element flowed
through Seneca,
yet we must admit that resemblances of tone and style do not
touch the essentials of the moral system, and fail to bridge
over the gulf between the Stoic and the Christian system. The
former was Pantheistic still; its God is diffused through all
the stages of creation; its providence is an inexorable fate;
its Holy Spirit ebbs and flows like tidal waves through all the
multitudinous realms of Nature.l5
He continues his discourse on Seneca's Stoicism by indicating
that the deity is not the persona we might conclude he is from
his attributes.
in such a system.

nThe Fatherhood of God is an unmeaning phrase
Instead of filial devotion to a personal

will, we have submission to an absolute law.ttl6

In yet another

place he says: uNo personal Maker had brought man into being;
there was no one to call him to account for his stewardship
of powers entrusted to his keeping.

Instead of, 'The Lord

giveth, the Lord hath taken away 1 • • • we read in Seneca, 'Fortune
has taken away my friend, but he was her gift.' nl7
14
15
16
17

Capes,
Capes,
Capes,
Capes,

173
172
173
175

r--....--------------.
21

In all this Capes treats Seneca's writings in general,
as can be seen from the quotations offered, and briefly mentions
some reflections of his own.

Without explicitly listing pass-

ages in Seneca or giving a fair sampling of quotations, he favors the opinion that Seneca's deity followed the Stoic concept
in all essentials, but that Seneca adopted a more devotional
tone, such as Plato would employ, whenever his purpose demanded
such a touch.

Just what Capes considered the essentials of

Stoicism we are unable to determine.

He is more outspoken in

deciding that the deity is not a personalized creator and benefactor, despite the allusions to charity, kindness, and benevolence,

alt~ough

he does stop short of telling us what God is,

and how he reached this decision.

Thus is proved again the

difficulty of extracting nny consistent views from Seneca.

With

reason, then, did Capes preface his remarks with the conviction
that "it has been said with truth that, as an author, Seneca
should be regarded rather as a spiritual director than as a
systematic moralist."l8
More willing than any of the previously mentioned
critics to accept the Christian expression of Seneca as well as
the possibility of a Christian meaning is the author, Frederic
W. Farrar, in his Seekers After

~·

He will not accept an en-

tirely Christian view of God because "his(Seneca's) eloquent
18

Capes , 143
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utterances about God often degenerate into a vague Pantheism."l9
He does admit, on the other hand, that there is about as much
to be said for one side as for another when he writes that the
"divergencies of Seneca from the spirit of Christianity are at
least as remarkable as the closest of his resemblances."20
To prove the resemblances to Christian principles Farfar spends much of one chapter(Ch. 15) giving passages in
Seneca that are parallel to those of Scripture and pointing out
that "he(Seneca) was no apathetic, self-contained, impassible
Stoic, but a passionate, warm-hearted man.tt21

We must wonder

at Seneca's expression, if we follow Farrar, because he denies
any intercourse between St. Paul and Seneca, and affirms, on
the contrary, that Seneca, as well as Epictetus and Marcus
•

Aurelius, ignored and despised all Christians.

Whence, there-

fore, does Farrar derive the material to make the following
remark?

"God was their God as well as ours - their Creator,

their preserver, who left not Himself without witness among
them ••• And His spirit was with them, dwelling within them,
though unseen and unkno.,m, purifying and sanctifying the
temple of their hearts. 112 2

This statement is true enough, but

the connotation that these three Romans recognized and under19
20
21
22
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stood God in the same way as.the Christians did is something
without any proof whatsoever.

Also, it seems less likely, by

Farrar's own admission, when we read:

11

Though there may be a

vague sense in which these(Seneca's) words may be admitted and
explained by Christians, yet, in the mind of Seneca, they led to
conclusions directly opposed to those of Christianity."23
Farrar approaches nearest to an examination of the deity
on whom all his other discussions hinge in a short paragraph
which leaves the question not entirely solved.
He(Seneca) diverges from Christianity in many of his modes of
regarding life, and in many of his most important beliefs.
What, for instance, is his main conception of the Deity?
Seneca is generally a Pantheist. No doubt he speaks of God's
love and goodness, but with him God is no personal living
Father, but the soul of the universe - the fiePy, primeval,
eternal principle which transfuses an inert, and no less
eternal, matter, and of which our souls are, as it were, but
divine particles or passing sparks.24
We find that Seneca is only "generally a Pantheist."

Does

this mean that Farrar's next few lines on the deity are to be
understood in this light or in their literal meaning?

Suppos-

ing that God "is no personal living Father," we have a greater
problem in determining what he is.

True, he is the

11

soul of

the universe," which, in turn, is a principle transfusing
matter.

When Farrar speaks of a "fiery" principle, is he to

be taken to mean something material?
ciple

11

tnansfuses" matter must it also be comprised of things

material?
23
24
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The question is left unanswered, though it can be more
easily deduced that the deity was the fiery matter present in
every existing thing.

Yet, even if this deduction is allowed,

it is weakened by the force of Farrar's concluding words on
Seneca.
I cannot consent to leave him with the language of depreciation,
and therefore here I will once more endorse what an anonymous
writer ahs said of him: 'An unconscious Christianity covers
all his sentiments. If the fair fame of the man is sullied,
the aspiration to a higher life cannot be denied to the philosopher; if tqe tinkling cymbal· of a stilted Stoicism sometimes
sounds through the nobler music, it still leaves the truer
melody vibrating on the ear.t25
Therefore, is the true theme coursing through Seneca a Christian

of God?

~w

For that question again no hint of an answer

has been given and no answer can be legitimately assumed.
A very interesting study of the conflicting sentiments
that Seneca causes to rise in his examiners is to be found in
Semuel Dill's book, Roman

Society~

Nero.:!?.£ Marcus Aurelius.

According to one man "it is not too much to say that this admirable work is
deals.n26

~

guide to the complex period with which it

Dill's opinion, therefore, can be expected to be the

result of detailed investigation.
Oddly enough, of all critics Dill takes the longest
step towards Christianizing the words of Seneca.
25
26
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with the feeling that "the cold materialistic conception of
God is irreconcilable with many passages in his(Seneca's)
writings.n27

Still, Dill is forced to admit:

In his views of the nature of God and His relation to the external world and the human soul, Seneca often seems to follow
the old Stoic tradition. ~1ere are other passages where he
seems to waver between different conceptions of God, the
Creator of the universe, the incorporeal Reason, the divine
breath diffused througn all things, great and small, Fate, or
the immutable chain of interlinked causation.28
.
As if this chain of thought brought new conclusions, Dill continues:
He tends towards a more ethical conception of the Deity, as
the Being, who loves and cares for ~en ••• Yet Seneca, in strict
theory, PROBABLY never became a dissenter from the physical or
ontological creed of his school. He adhered, in the last resort, to the Stoic Pantheism, which represented God and the
universe, force and formless matter, as ultimately issuing from
the one substratum of the ethereal fire of HeraclitusA and in
the great cataclysm, returning again to their source.~9
He concedes Seneca's "ethical conception of the Deity,u but he
has to allow also that Seneca "probably" remained Stoic, materialist, and Pantheist.
There is another vista opened, however, in Dill's rejoinder that Seneca "had absolutely broken with paganism.tt30
Nor did he say this in a hesitating and doubtful manner.

"Sen-

eca is far more modern and advanced than even the greatest of
the Neo-Platonic school, just because he saw that the old
27
28
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theology was hopelessly effete.

He could never have joined in

the last struggle of philosophic paganism with the Church. u31
carried on by the enthusiasm of this last remark, Dill goes
even farther from his original Stoic interpretations.
He(Seneca) adheres formally to the lines of the old Stoic system in his moments of calm logical consistency. But when the
enthusiasm of humanity, the passion to win souls to goodness
and moral truth is upon him, all the old philosophical differences fade, the new wine bursts the old bottles; the Platonic
dualism, the eternal conflict of flesh and spirit, the Platonic
vision of God, nay, a higher vision of the Creator, the pitiful
and loving Guardian, the Giver of all good, the Power which
draws us to Himself, who receives us at death, and in whom is
our eternal beatitude, these ideas, so alien to the older
Stoicism, transfigure its hardness and its cold, repellent mora
idealism becomes a religion.32
It is easy to detect in this passage Dill's attraction to the
idealistic conception of God in Seneca.

He thinks he sees

Seneca adopt a dualistic philosophy and abandon the ancient
materialistic monism of the Stoics.

His eagerness to envision

a spiritual explanation to Seneca's words is very evident in
the preceding passage.

He becomes even more definite after

further consideration.

"In Seneca he(God) develops into a

moral and SPIRITUAL BEING, the source of all spiritual intuition and virtuous emotion, the secret power within us making
for righteousness, as he is the secret force in all nature
making for order.n33

Nor is this just one isolated sentence.

While not entirely neglecting certain Stoic tendencies in
31
32
33
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seneca, Dill comes out directly to call God again a spiritual
power, if not a person.

"However loyal he may be in form to

Stoic materialism, Seneca in the end regards God as no mere
material force, however refined and etherealized, but a SPIRITUAL POVVER: not perhaps limited by the .. bounds of personality,
instinct with moral tendencies, nay, a moral impetus, which no
mere physical force could ever develop. tt34

Here Dill seems to

recognize the peculiarity of his position, insofar as he asserts Seneca formally adheres to Stoicism, but actually believes in dualism and the spirituality of God's nature.

How-

ever, he does not see his way clear to accept any other explanation.

Besides, ·for him it is quite superficial to con-

trast materialist and idealist conceptions of God since he believes human thought and speech are incapable of escaping contradictions in any consideration of God.

"What human con-

ception of Him is free from similar contradictions?
any conception of Him, expressed in human

langua~e,

How can
avoid

them?" 35
This is Dill's final answer.
He is spiritual power.

God is material force;

He says that there is a contradiction

in the way Seneca presents these aspects of God, but that it is
impossible to speak of God without these contradictions.
this statement Dill thinks he exonerates both himself and
34
35
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seneca from the charge of being incomprehensible, or, at the
very least, indecisive.
It is quite remarkable to note how so many scholars
have attempted to give their reactions to Seneca's words, and
with a certain amount of consistency.

Some, it is true, do not

lmow what conclusions can be drawn from what they read, others
do not believe Seneca had anything definite in mind, and still
others thought he took these basic points for granted.

There

is a unity of belief amongst them, though, because a go·od selection of quotations prove that most hold to the general tone
of Stoicism in Seneca's writings.

The question seems to be

how much Seneca depended on Stoicism when he spoke of God.
this point, as we have noted, divergent opinions arose.

On

There

are shades of variance ranging from pure materialism up the
scale to almost pure spirituality.
quite the

s~~e

And no two critics give

answer.

Because of the wide range of opinions exhibited on this
point, and because, with all due respect to the men who have
formulated these views, a complete analysis of this question
has been sidetracked for less confusing issues, there is still
room for yet another examination of Seneca's philosophical
.essays and letters.
arrive at

so~e

The following chapters will endeavor to

definitive answer to the question of the nature

of Seneca's Supreme Being.

This will be done by considering

the various philosophical influences exercised on Seneca and
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by studying the words of Seneca himself.

Hence, by taking the

latter in their literal meaning together with their relation to
the former it will be possible to reach a solution for not the
least of the problems to be found in Seneca's writings.

CHAPTER III
INFLUENCES ON SENECA
Every great thinker, no matter how original his ideas,
procedure, or conclusions, has in his lifetime been influenced
by his teachers, readings, and associates.

Some thought pro-

voking sentence or word coming from Democritus caused Epicurus
to pause and consider the value of his atomic theory of the
universe.

Heraclitus 1 fiery TTIIVi'.P-0(. assisted the Stoics in form-

ing a stronger link between earth and heaven, between man and
the ultimate principle of Being.
Socrates.

Plato and Aristotle had their

As his predecessors Socrates possessed the Pytha-

goreans, Eleatics, and Milesians.

In turn these men had in the

preceding ages of history their wise men, their teachers, their
exemplars.
Seneca was no exception to this rule.
far beyond its simple proof.

Rather, he goes

He lived in an age that had sus-

tained the weieht of many divergent philosophies for centuries.
For one as interested in philosophy as he, this meant contact
not merely with Academic or Peripatetic teachin.ss, but also
with those other four current schools at Rome: the Sextii,
Cynics, Epicureans, and Stoics.

And it is from the latter

group that Seneca especially received his early ideas and de-

31
veloped his philosophical doctrines.
Strangely enough, it is not to Plato and Aristotle that
Seneca is indebted, but to what one man has termed the "lesser
philosophies."

However, this is quite understandable when we

remember the character of the Roman people.
a practical man above all else.

For the Roman was

The speculative abstractions

in Plato's ideal world and the syllogistic exactness in Aristotle's metaphysical deductions either were too involved for
him to bother about or made no sense after a cursory examination.

It has been said, and rightly, that

it was consistent with the Roman spirit, however, to estimate
the worth of philosophy, as of all other things, primarily
according to the standard of utility; and, on the contrary to
ascribe no importance to scientific opinions as such, yhen no
great influence on human life was perceptible in them.
Thus the Sextii, the Cynics, the Epicureans, and the Stoics
could attract the Roman because they, just as he, were interested in conduct, in "an applied science of life, offering for
troublesome enigmas a solution. n2

Henry D. Sedgwick sums this

quite well when he says:
The Athenians demanded a metaphysical basis for their ethical
creed, because by nature they took pleasure in abstract thought
and academic disputations. The Romans, on the other hand, were
a practical people, indifferent to metaphysics and science, but
deeply interested in matters of conduct.3
1
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Seneca himself we will find was no exception to this rule when
we study at close hand the nature of his writing and the content of his teachings.

But more immediately we must see that

each of these currently popular philosophies had come into contact with Seneca.

This point requires little proof.

In fact,

it demands nothing more than a brief mention of a number of
passages from Seneca's writings.
First of all Seneca tells of his admiration for Quintus
Sextius, the founder of the school which took his name.

Sex-

tius had lived in the age of Augustus and had rejected a political career to give himself over completely to philosophy.
One of his followers, Sotion of Alexandria, was an early professor of Seneca and it was because of him that Seneca came to
express his esteem for Sextius himself.

This Seneca did in no

uncertain terms and on frequent occasions.

Two of the most

lavish encomia are spoken in his Epistulae Morales.

He says::

"Sextium ecce cum maxime lego, virum acrem, Graecis verbis,
Romania moribus philosophantem."4

The expression "cum maxime

lego" indicates the zeal and relish with which he went through
this man's works.

In another place Seneca fervently states:

lectus est deinde liber Quinti Sextii patris, magni, si quid
mihi credis, viri ••• Quantus in illo, di boni, vigor est, quantum animil Hoc non in omnibus philosophis invenies; quorundam
scripta clarum habentium nomen exanguia sunt. Instituunt, dis
putant, cavillantur, non faciunt animum, quia non habent: cum
legeris Sextium, dices: 'Vivit, viget, liber est, supra homine
4
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est, dimittit me plenum ingentis fiduciae.5
Besides these words of praise for Sextius, Seneca has incorporated many of his ideas, through his professor Sotion, into
hiS own teaching.

He approves of Sextius' abstinence,6 of his

advice concerning anger,7 and of his examination of consciencefo
Quite obviously Sextius and Sotion made a deep impression upon
Seneca and must be reckoned as guiding his development.
Another early teacher of Seneca is mentioned often and
with feeling in the letters to Lucilius.

It is not often that

a student tries to be the first to school and the last to depart.
eca.

Still, that was the effect of Attalus on the young SenHe recalls this in rather effusive fashion.

"Haec nob.ls

praecipere Attalum memini, cum scholam ejus opsideremus et
primi veniremus et novissimi exiremus, ambulantem quoque i1lum
ad aliquas disputationes evocaremus, non
centibus, sed obvium." 9

~antum

paratum dis-

Later he reminisces:. "Attalum memini

cum magna admiratione omnium haec dicere.ttlO

Undoubtedly it

was through his efforts that Seneca became an eager admirer and
panegyrist of Stoic principles.

For Attalus was very definitel

a Stoic and a forceful one at that.

He spoke with such con-

viction of the value of poverty, for instance, that Seneca said
5
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he wished to leave the lecture room a poor man.
e schola pauperi libuit.nll

"Saepe exire

In a following letterl2 Seneca de-

votes great space to presenting Attalus' opinion of theworthlessness of riches.

Seneca gives full-voiced approval to all

that Attalus says when he remarks

t~at

by imitating Attalus'

advice you will be striving for actual happiness and not for its
mere appearance.

"Haec nobis Attalus dixit: quae si voles fre-

quenter cogitare, id ages, ut sis felix, non ut videaris, et ut
tibi videaris, non aliis." 1 3

Thus do we find the Stoic element

moving and forming to a certain degree the thoughts that were
to flow from the pen of Seneca.
Epicureanism, likewise, receives frequent mention in
Seneca's works, but nowhere as in his

De~

Beata does he

praise its position quite so vigorously.
In ea quidem ipse sententia sum ••• sancta Epicurum et vita praecipere et, si propius arcesseris, tristia; voluptas enim illa
ad parvum et exile revocatur et quam nos virtuti legem dicimus,
eam ille dicit voluptati~ jubet illam parere naturae.l4
Later he continues: "Itaque non dicam ••• sectam Epicuri flagitiorum magistram esse, sed illud dico: male audit, infamis est,
et innnerito.nl5

But these selections are not all.

In many of

his early Epistulae Morales Seneca closes with a short saying
of Epicurus by which he presses some practical point for Lu11
12
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cilius to ponder and to carry into execution.

"Honesta res est

laeta paupertas" is the bit of advice with which he concludes
Letter Two.

"Magnae divitiae sunt lege naturae composita pau-

pertas" ends Letter Four; and in Letter Eight Seneca has it
that "philosophiae servias oportet ut tibi contingat vera libertas ."

Letters Twelve, T'nirteen, Fourteen, Sixteen, Seyen-

teen, Eighteen, and Twenty One, to consider just a few of the
earlier letters, all quote with complete approbation some select bit of Epicurean advice.

In this wise Seneca plainly

shows a thorough knowledge of Epicurus and his agreement with at
least certain Epicurean teachings.

This means also that it was

possible for Seneca to have chosen part of the Epicurean
physics, metaphysics, and theolog-y for himself.
The last group that played an important part in forming
Seneca's phil:)sophical doctrines were the Cynics.

These men

must be mentioned, however, not because of any special favor
they received in Seneca's eyes, but rather because they constituted a negative norm of his beliefs.

Seneca did not take

issue with the character of every individual Cynic because, of
Demetrius, he must admit "egregie enim hoc dicere Demetrius Cyn
icus, vir meo judicio magnus, etiam si maximis comparetur;"l6
but of their doctrines and mode of life he apparently can find
nothing worthy of approval.

Speaking to a Cynic who asks for

money after expressing a hatred of it, Seneca says: "Indixisti
16
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pecuniae odium ; hoc professus es, hanc personam induisti:
agenda est.nl7

Then in the De Brevitate Vitae he states what

seems to him a distinctive feature of various schools in the
words: "Disputare cum Socrate licet, dubi tare cum Carneade, cum
Epicuro quiescere, hominis naturam cum Stoicis vincere, cum
Cynicis excedere.nl8

There is no odious attachment to any of

these epithets except that applied to the Cynics.

Discussion,

doubt, peace, and virtue are all in accord with human nature.
It is left to the Cynics alone "excedere hominis naturam.tt

In

looking at their concept of God, then, we must remember that
seneca stood in opposition to their manner of seeking happiness
and for.their explanation, or lack of explanation, of the ultimate principles of· the universe.

For ttthe Cynic is opposed

to the whole world; he need.s for virtue no scientific knowledge
of the world and its laws; he regards nothing external to himself; he allows nothing to influence his conduct, and.attaches
value to nothing. ttl9
These were the four groups, then, that played an important part in developing and advancing the theories and applications of morality that Seneca was to propound in his writings.
All scholars agree that Seneca followed the Stoic school of
thought in general outline.
17
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to prove anything else when Seneca uses the words nos and nos-

-

tros in speaking of the Stoics in many passages.

Besides, the

high praise which he renders to their teachers, propositions,
and to their way of life all point to his approval of their position.

Still, it must be remembered that

in Seneca, the freer position in regard to the doctrine of his
school which he claimed for himself, is shown in his views concerning the end and problem in philosophy. If in the original
tendencies of Stoicism there already lay a preponderance of the
practical interest over the theoretical, with Seneca this was
so greatly increased that he regarded many things considered by
the older teachers of the school to be essential constituents
of philosophy as unnecessary and superfluous.20
Seneca also indicates his free use of other than Stoic ideas in
admitting "quicquid bene dictum est ab ullo, meum est,n21 and
again in asking of Lueilius, "quid enim nocet alienis uti ex
parte qua nostra sunt?"22

And he proceeds in the first in-

stance to quote Epicurus and in the second Plato.
Since Seneca has manifested a certain trend toward eclecticism in his doctrines, it makes the investigation of the
schools influencing him all the more important.

We will con-

sider in succession the concept of God as proposed by the Cynics, the Sextii, the Epicureans, and the Stoics before advancing to the study of Seneca in his essays and letters.
over, since the physics of the Stoics and Epicureans is in
reality the basis of their explanation of God, it is also
20
21
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necessary to give a complete picture of their natural science.
This procedure is not superfluous in the least.

Instead, it

contains

~

germine the ultimate answer to the question of this

thesis.

For after studying Seneca's words, ideas, and modes

of expression concerning the deity, it becomes necessary to find
in what light these utterances are to be valued.
to signify? Or Fortune?

Or Nature?

What is Fate

What is the nature of the

being that corresponds to this terminology?

This can only be

understood by considering Seneca's explanation of the universe.
And his conclusions concerning the universe will be more easily
interpreted when measured against the schools of thought that
came to have such an important place in his education and in
his writings.

These were the Cynics, the Sextii, the Epicu-

reans, and the Stoics.
SECTION A
THE CYNICS
Whether the followers of Antisthenes received the name
"Cynics" from the gymnasium Cynosarges in whieh they held
school or whether from the type of life they led, popular belief is more in favor of the second possibility.
Although Antisthenes had been a devoted disciple of
Socrates, he lacked the broad view of the true philosopher.

Or,

perhaps, it was because he was such a devout believer in Socrates that his outlook on philosophy had become narrow.

For

"what Antisthenes had most admired and imitated in Socrates was

. 39

his independence of character; on

t~1is

account he attached no

value to scientific investigation in so far as it had no direct
bearing on active life.n 2 3
From that moment the die was cast.

"Cynicism remained
to the end a mode of life rather than a system of thought. n 2 4
Art, learning, mathematics, science were all considered worthless.

Only virtue was good and vice alone was evil.

Since the only good for man is what is appropriate(o~KttoV ) to
him and this is nothing more than his mental and spiritual possessions, everything else, fortune, honour, freedom, health,
life itself, are in themselves not goods, nor are poverty,
shame, slavery, i~lness and death in themselves evils; least of
all should pleasure be regarded as a good and toil and labour
as an evil; since the former, when it becomes a man's master,
corrupts him, while the latter nay teach him vlirtue.25
Thus the precepts of a practical morality constituted the whole

.

of philosophy for the Cynics.
But even that is not worthy of condemnation.

It was

the manner in which they believed that virtue was to be acquired and the explanation of virtue that merited for them the
title, "dog-like" philosophers.
As was said, Antisthenes admired the independence of
Socrates. ·rn his own philosophy then he wished "to isolate the
individual and maintain his independence, his natural f'reedom
23
24
25

Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, 108-9
Paul E. More, HelleniStic Philosophies, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1923, 72
Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, 109

40
and self-sufficiency.

Indeed, to Antisthenes, the autonomy of

the individual, his independence of everything but himself,
seemed of itself to constitute that supreme good which Socrates
had taught him to seek.n26
of any bondage.

In other words, this is a negation

Self is asserted against everything that be-

longs to the not-self; the individual demands to be his own law
and end.
In this way the Cynics were occupied with the negative
side of philosophy.

The1r "activity was taken up in the mani-

festation of hatred for institutions and principles of a

soci~

which seemed to hinder the expression of one's individuality.'e
Naturally they were revolutionists, ready to dissolve the
family and society, just to bring men back to nature.

The

Cynics, however,
interpreted the precept 1 Follow Nature' negatively and destructively by ridiculing the institutions of his country and the
very idea of patriotism and by making a violent protest in his
daily life and behaviour against the traditional code and the
established order. This nature became almost another name for
anarchism and unparalleled license was permitted to individual
caprice.28
With this interpretation of life it was impossible for
the Cynics to maintain any

serio~s

form of religion.

For in

arming man against man they also armed him against heaven.

We

would even suppose that the Cynic would neglect religion and
26
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God completely.

William L. Davidson in The Stoic Creed offers

a possible answer to this paradox.
~hen

we remember his(Cynic's) acceptance of the primitive man
as his model for life and conduct, we can readily see that he
could not consistently have done it. For, to primitive men
were due the gods and the accredited mythologies; and so these
mythologies must somehow be accepted, if we are to return to a
life conformable with nature. Obviously, however, they could
not be accepted by philosophers in their bare literality, and
so they must be allegorized.29
Were there actually any gods then?

Zeller says the Cynics held

that "only convention created the multitude of godstt30 and that
"they treated the religious beliefs and cults of their people
in a spirit of enlightenment. tt31

The Cynics, '::owever, would

not even give lip service to the accredited for.m of worship.
And the reason stemmed from Antisthenes' denial of the spiritua
side of Socratic teach1ng.

Antisthenes was a materialist and

accepted Nature as he saw it.

"Antisthenes, apparently, was

what Plato would call a semi-atheist: some kind of God he accepted as a power more or less identical with Nature; but it
was a God rer'ote from mankind, while the popular worship ••• was
to the Cynic a matter of jest and contempt."32
Thus there was some sort of God for the Cynic, but the
popular gods he termed allegorical.

And the God he did admit

was material and, perhaps, identified w1th Nature.
29
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actual essence of God, his attributes, his rela.t ions to nen and
the world the Cynic tells nothing.

Man alone and his conduct

are of interest to Antisthenes and the rest of his followers.
SECTION B
THE SEXTII
This little-known and short-lived school of philosophy
played more than a passing part in Seneca's life.

It had been

founded by Quintus Sext~_us, a Roman, somewhere around 40 B.c.
After his death its teachings were handed down first by his son
and then by Sotion of Alexandria, Cornelius Celsus, Lucius Crassitius of Tarentum, and Fabianus Papirius.

But the school was

little-known and short-lived precisely because its mark was left
only by the individual named.
S·eneca, however, we have seen, in his early youth had
been an admirer of this school and frequently praised its foun
in his Epistles.

The reason for this praise lies, no doubt, in

his contact with above named Sotion of Alexandria.

In one

letter33 Seneca says he was a puer and in another34 he calls
himself a juvenis at the time he eagerly listened to the words
of Sotion.
But what influence might these men have had on Seneca's
philosophy~

33
34
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lost, with exception of some scattered utterances of the
elder Sextius, of Sotion, and Fabianus.n35

The important thing

to note is that in the writings that did remain there was
nothing different from the teachings of Stoicism.

True, the

sextii were more exclusively intent upon ethics than the Stoics,
but in what they both treated their doctrines were the same.
They, too, held that all syllogistic tricery is a waste of effort unless some moral principle is thereby to be inculcated.
We must also always be in readiness to strike down that great
enemy of man, folly.
The closest thing, however, to any mention of their
view of God is reported to us by Seneca and that statement is in
\

entire accord with the Stoic teaching.

"Solebat Sextius dicere

Jovem plus non posse quam bonum virum.n36

The Stoics say the

same thing when they mention that "bonus tempore tantum a deo
differt."37

What the Stoic view of God was in its completeness

will be seen later on; the opinions of the Sextii, for all practical purposes, may be declared the same.
Zeller sums up the work of the Sextii very well by stating that
we therefore find nothing in their school that is new and scientifically noticeable; it is a branch of Stoicism, which doubtless is indebted to the personality of its founder that it had
35
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an independent existence for a time. 38
If the Sextii did influence Seneca to any extent, they
merely augmented and

stre~hened

the Stoic ideas that he was al-

ready receiving in abundance from Attalus, another of his early
teachers.
SECTION C
THE EPICUREAN"S
Epicurus and his disciples were no different from the
Cynics, Sextii, and Stoics in giving their attention predominantly to the study of ethics.

Their position, however, is some-

what unique in that they tried to weave a physical pattern into
the univ·erse in order to justify the quest of pleasure, the object of their philosophy.
paradox of Epicurean logic.

And herein lies the extraordinary
It "begins with regarding pleasure

as the only positive good and ends by emptying pleasure of all
positive content.tt39

Epicurus admitted this visible world of

bodies as the only reality, and believed that the only thing
which has any certain value to man is his own immediate physical
sensatio.::Ls.

But, since it was harder to keep pain from the body

at the very time of seeking pleasures, Epicurus was driven into
a purely defensive attitude of life.

Vfuile avowedly looking for

positive pleasure he actually spent his time warding off the
38
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more disagreeable elements of life.

And one of the greatest of

these was the so-called fear of the gods.

This accounts for

his explanation of the gods, as we shall soon see.
It must be said to Epicurus' praise that he was able to
see "t':1at you cannot have ethical doctrine without a basis of
physical and metaphysical doctrine; you can have no rule of
conduct without some view of the universe wherein the action is
to take place.tt40

Still, he looked at this principle from such

an angle as to make it explain the preconceived notions he had
formulated on pleasure and the greatest enemy of pleasure, the
fear of the gods.

Epicurus believed that any

supernat~ral

in-

fluence in the world deprived man of his peace of mind and kept
him in constant fear.

Hence he attempted to develop a system

of physics and metaphysics to explain away any and all supernatural power the gods might exert over the destinies of men.
Since Epicurus was not interested in natural science
for its own sake, he was content to offer merely a general explanation of the world.

He wished to say only as much as

necessary to renove the fear of the gods and to indicate that
all natural phenomena can be explained by natural causes.

And

even in desiring to do this he was unwilling to, or incapable
of, making new studies before presenting his own case.

There-

fore,
40
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confining his interest in nature, as Epicurus did, entirely to
this general view of things, he was all the more inclined, in
carrying it out into details, to rely upon some older system.
No system, however, appeared to correspond better with his tone
of mind than that of Democritus, which commended itself to him
••• by referring everything to matter, and by its theory of
atoms.41
Democritean atomism best suited Epicurus' "tone of mind" because for Epicurus the alm of philosophy was to promote human
happiness with each individual being the ultimate end of all
action, whereas with Delnocritus all that is real is individual
atoms.

For both, then, what is individual is the only reality.

Hence, the natural science of Democritus seemed to present the
best basis for the Epicurean ethics.
were the basic constituents of all things for Democritus.
Therefore, they were the basic constituents for Epicurus.
But what did all this entail?

It meant that the only

reality is corporeal substance as divined in the ultimate
atomic particles.

These atoms also have always existed and

will never cease to exist because they cannot be divided any
further into nothingness and destroy the first precept of Democ
. ritean natural science, namely, that nothing can come from
nothing and nothing can be resolved into nothing.

Then to ex-

plain the origin of the world Democritus had stated that a
large number of these atoms had gathered in this particular

"' •
section of the To' K.evov

At some later date plants, animals,

and men apparently just happened to come into existence by some
41
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fortuitous association of atoms, for on this point Epicureanism
is strangiy silent.
However, did all this affect the popular belief in the
gods?

Epicurus was sure it did.

W"ith the atomic system as the

ultimate cause of all things, we would think that Epicurus had
abolished the gpds completely and that he had lapsed into complete atheism.
But here, for one reason or another, he drew back. Though the
thought of Providence was utterly repugnant to him, and though
he swept away, with one grand gesture of disdain the whole fabric of signs and portents and prophecy, he still in a fashion
clung to the existence of the gods.42
This is just another Epicurean paradox.

Freedom from fear is

the primary aim of his philosophy.

And Epicurus associated re-

ligion and the gods with this fear.

Nevertheless, he did not

abolish the gods as his physics seemed to postulate.

Why?

He did not, however, make any attack on belief in the gods,
partly because the universality of this belief seemed to prove
that it rested on real existence, and that the images from the
appeara::1ce of which alone he can explain it arise at least partly from real things and are therefore perceptions and not merely
ima~ined images; partly, because he himself felt the need of beholding his idea of happiness realized in the gods.43
Of these three reasons for retaining the gods the last opens the
way to the Epicurean concept of the gods.
Since human beings alone appear in any concepts that
arise in our waking mind and in any dreams to represent the
42
43
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gods, it stands to reason, so say the Epicureans, that the gods
are human beings.

Upon consideration we realize that the human

form is the most beautiful and that man alone is endowed with
the great faculty of the intellect.

Cicero in his De Natura

Deorum44 even had Epicurus attribute the difference of sex to
the gods.
The gods have two attributes that are very proper to
their being, perfect happiness and immortality.

However, the

gods could not possess such qualities if the atoms comprising
their bodies were as dense as those in human bodies.

Thus, they

have bodies t 11at consist of atoms that are tenues, perlucidi,
and perflabiles.

Because bodies of this sort would have dif-

ficulty in existing in a world such as ours Epicurus places the
abode of the gods in a region between the worlds, the intermundia.
Living as these gods do apart from the world, they
cannot be expected to be interested in the affairs of men.
Moreover, how could they possibly enjoy complete happiness if
they were burdened by the cares of the world?

And in what did

the happiness of the gods consist?
The gods were exempt from sleep, sleep being a partial death,
and not needed by beings who live without any exertion ••• Were
powers of speech to be refused them, they would be deprived of
the highest means of enjoyment - the power of conversing with
their equals .45
44
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In brief, these gods possess everything they could possibly
desire.

Why should they be interested in, or angry at, the

deeds of men?
As-difficult to understand as it may seem, Epicurus
built up an entire section of physics in his philosophy to disprove the popular beliefs in religion and the gods only to use
this same system to explain another set of deities more in
accord with the fundamental aim of his ethical doctrines.
Logically he should have been an atheist, proposing as he did
his materialistic and monistic casualism.

But after all his

scientific meanderings he finally allowed a vast system of
carefree, blissful, and disinterested gods anyway.
SECTION D
THE STOICS
Like the Epicureans the Stoics gave an explanation of
the physical universe as the basis of their concept of God.
However, unlike the Epicureans they made an earnest effort to
delve into the secrets of nature and God's being.
cureans, we recall, cared nothing for science.

The ·Epi-

T-hey used it

only to give an apparent logic to their principles of pleasure
and exclusion of any supernatural force on the lives of men.
Though the Stoics were interested primarily in ethics,
since their philosophy was concerned with right action and virtue, they still saw that right action was rational action.

And,

50

in turn, rational action is action that is in harmony with human nature and physical nature.

Hence the Stoic principle

vivere secundum naturam expressed a twofold purpose.

Conduct

and virtue flowed from the individual, but for such action to
be good was impossible unless the individual was in harmony
with the laws of the universe.

In this way the Stoic physical

philosophy received more attention than would have been otherwise devoted to it.

Still, even in the physical examination of

the universe their
physical philosophy came to be that which should rather be
called metaphysica or theology, the part which has to do, not
with the relations of physical phenomena to each other, but
only with relations of the material universe to God.46
In searching through the physical world for the ultimate principle of Being, Zeno came to the conclusion that anything is real that can act or be acted upon, 'T~
I

ff~~E~~.

rrotf.L'I/

r, Kclt ·

Following the guidance of his senses Zeno at once

limited reality to corporeal or material objects.

There were

innumerable difficulties brought forward against this bold
statement.

For, how could virtue, passion, emotion, day,

month fall under this definition?

Were these bodies?

The

Stoic answered that the things comn1only considered incorporeal
were in actuality only material when you investigated them
closely enough.

"It must be remarked that the Stoics dis-

tinguish between a finer and a coarser materialn47 and that
46
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"the common distinction between corporeal and incorporeal is
merely a distinction between coarser and finer matter."48

Not

much of an explanation to be sure, but they offered it anyway
as being consistent with the principles that were originally
postulated.
Once the Stoics committed themselves to

t-~1is

fundamenta

explanation of physical nature it was easy to foresee, at least
in general, the course that their entire physics would follow.
The whole world was either a vast materialistic machine or a
powerful dynamic material force.

God in either case for the

Stoic was to be something material, whether it be gross matter
or active force.

The complete answer, however, lies much

mor~

beneath the surface.
Matter alone was the only reality for the Stoics, but
this they interpreted differently than the Epicureans.

The

latter also believed in materialism, but they maintained the
universe was a machine made up of fine atoms.

Thus the Epicur-

eans placed the idea of matter as foremost in their explanation
The Stoics, however, placed force above matter.

Matter was

still the basis of all things, but it was matter in action.
There really was only one element in nature, but it was viewed
under two aspects.

''l
The first was v~~

/

nrw•~

,

primordial

matter; the passive element from which all things were formed.
48
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The second was the active element, wl1ich forms things out of
matter.

This active element they further called the efficient

cause of all things.

And, as there is just one matter, there

can be but one cause, since matter and force, or cause, are
identical.

It follows, then, that everything that exists or

happens is due to this one efficient cause.
Reverting to a fundamental principle of Stoic physics
that everything that acts is material, they said that the efficient cause was likewise material.

But what was the nature

of this efficient cause?
Falling back upon the ancient hylozoistic philosophy which
found the source of nature in some one primordial stuff possess
ing the characteristics of life, and more particularly upon
Heraclitus, he(Zeno) declared that the universal substratum of
things was fire, or an element like fire in its fineness and
fluidity. 49
Everywhere heat is seen as the germinative power of life and
growth.

All things, also, have their own heat, and are

served in life by the heat of the sun.

pre~

Naturally, they said,

what applies to parts· of the world must be appli_ed to the
whole.

Since heat or fire has this actuating and preserving

force, this ttis the power to .which the life and existence of
of the world must be referred.n50
Stoics in his De Natura Deorum,

11 Ex

Or, as Cicero quotes the
quo concluditur, cum omnes

mundi partes sustineantur calore, mundum etiam ipsum simili
49
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parique natura in tanta diuturnitate servari: eQque magis quod
intelligi debet, calidum illum atque igneum ita in omni fusum
esse natura, ut in eo insit procreandi vis.n 5 l
From this point the Stoic conclusions are drawn without
hesitation.

This same world, which is the offspring of the one

fiery element, manifests such great beauty, completeness, and
order that there must be design or a plan behind it.
man possesses reason.
this power, unless

Then, too,

How could he, a part of the world, have

t~:1e

whole world held it first of all 'Z

Cicero

adds another reason taken from Zeno as he remarks: "Zeno enim
ita concludit: quod ratione utitur, mellus est, quam id, quod
ratione non utitur.
mundus utitur.tt52

Nihil autem mundo melius.

Ratione igitur

Moreover, there are creatures on the earth

endowed with consciousness and a soul.
itself is conscious, has a soul.

'J.herefore, the world

In brief, then, the universe

is basically a material force which consists of the

N

Tr't'Eufoc.,

or artificial fire, possessing consciousness, a soul, and even
reason.

"'

ThisiTVEU~~

with its qualities animates all things and

I

contains the a"lTEf ~Q(-rotJ

,

or seeds, of all forms of being within

itself.
One could question further into the nature of the Soul
of the universe and the meaning of Reason, since this termin51
52
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ology inserts an element of spirituality into the materialism
already proposed.

These names also lead us to the very thres-

hold of the Stoic deity.

However, such an investigation would

not render much satisfaction, for the same question has been in
the mind of many scholars for years.

One gives up in disgust,

bemoaning the Stoic vagueness and lack of analysis.
Yes, but what did this mean?

"Reason?

This surely is just one of the

points where Stoicism,in its haste to construct a dogmatic system for popular use, stops short with a vague and unanalysed
concept. n53

Let us not be thwarted, however, by failing to

understand this one term.
materialism.

Zeno postulated complete dynamistic

That we know for certain.

The difficulty arises

when Zeno, or Cleanthes, or Cicero uses terminology which,
according to present interpretation, has a spiritual meaning.
Following this lead, we think the ancient Stoics contradict
themselves at every step when in one instance Fire is the

bas~

of all things, and in another Reason seems to be ruling the
universe.
Reason.

We are incapable of juxtaposing or equating Fire and
That leads Caird to conclude that

11

Stoicism seems very

confusing because in the exposition of unity it passes abruptly
from materialism to spiritualism, from individualism to pantheism.tt54

And Bevan states that

on the material side the doctrine conveys an~prehensible
meaning; we can picture more or less a huge fiery sphere in
empty space. On its spiritual side, it is harder to make sense
of. For, to begin with, we can do little with a conception
53
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which identifies Reason with a material substance. 5 5
Very probably the Stoics did not intend any spiritual interpretation to be attached to Soul, Reason, or Providence.

Sedgwick

in a remarkable analysis explains everything according to the
materialistic principles postulated by the ancient Stoics.
If we fix our attention on the orderly course of nature, on the
steady sequence of phenomena, and especially upon the inexorable constraint in the lives of men, this cosmic energy assumes
the aspect that we call FATE. But if we shift our attention to
the relation of cause and ~ffrct, and ponder upon the cause of
causes, the power becomes ~l t' lc(, which corresponds after a
fashion to the modern term FIRST CAUSE. Or, again, if we look
at the universe from a biological point of view and concern
ourselves mainly with the processes of life in animate creation,
then, under that aspect, this power finds a more appropriate
name as NATURE, the principle,of growth and organic changes,
for which the Greek word is cpu~ I~. And, finally, if we reflect
on the marvellous adaptation of part to part, how all things
subserve other interests, how plan and purpose seem to run
through the whole system, more especially if we feel gratitude
and are able to pronounce the universe good, in that case the
power assunes a sort of personality and becomes lTjovoLOII ,
PROVIDENCE. 56
But what of Reason?

It also fits into the same plan.

When

this primary material element works accord1.ng to set laws,
then it is called Reason.

Thus, Reason, in reality, is not

the spiritual or intellectual faculty that we know.

It is

merely the basic Fire of the world considered as universal Law,
as the systematic course of the world's movements and changes!i7
As confusing and contradictory as the language of the
Stoics is at first glance it all becomes clear when we follow
55
56
57

Bevan, 51
Sedgwick, 264
Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, 216

56
logically from the first principles of their physics.

Those

principles are purely materialistic and with no admixture of
spirituality.

The Stoic conception of the deity, likewise, is

understandable enough when examined in the same logical manner.
The foregoing investigation into the physical makeup of
the universe has really presented the nature of the Stoic divinity.
"V

For, when the Stoics speak of God as Fire, Ether,V"oU's ,

JTVEvfot.,,

/

Trfovot.~,

Universal Law, Nature, Fate, or Providence,

they mean one, and only one, thing.

The terms simply signify

various aspects of the one prj_mary force-laden matter penetrating the universe.

It is unimportant whether the original ele-

ment is called Heat, Air-Current, Fire, or Ether, for all are
likewise of a material essence.
Somewhat confused by the widely variant phraseology of
the Stoics certain philosophers think that "Stoic theology is
an attempt to compromise between theism and pantheism.n58

They

obviously find themselves, without realizing it, considering
certain Christian aspects of such terms as heason and Soul.

But

neither, on the one hand, can they they avoid the very material
significance of Efficient Cause, Nature, Fire, and Matter.

In

a word, they are confronted with the same difficulty that was
presented in the Stoic system of physics.
58
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principle of Being is the same in each case, there can only be
one conclusion.

If the First Gause and primary source of things

is material Fire for the Stoic physicist, it must be for the
stoic theologian as well, unless, of course, there is objective
evidence to the contrary.

And there is none.

The consistent view has been crystallized by Ralph Stob
in his article, "Stoicism and Ghristiani ty, tt for the Classical
Journal.

He says: "Stoicism has neither an ultimate spirit, nor

an ultimate personality.

For this same fiery substance is

everywhere, in man, the material universe, the heavenly bodies.
This is the all pervading divinity.n59
spirit, and he is not a person.
tinct from the universe?
same reality.

No.

Thus, God is not a

Is God any kind of being disThe universe and God are the

The varied terminology expresses only different

manifestations of the same being.

Sedgwick's application and

interpretation of Fate, Nature, Providence, and First Gause in
the Stoic physics holds true here also because the

~

indepen-

dens must be the same no matter what science we are considering.
If we call to mind once more the original premise of
the Stoics that that alone is real which has a material form
and is of a material nature, the problem of uniting the material and the spiritual in God disappears, just as it did in the
59

Stob, Classical Journal, 30.219
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analysis of the Stoic ultimate principle in physics.
God is called the Soul,

va~5

Although

1 or Reason, the words mean nothing

spiritual, but presuppose that these conceptions have bodies,
just as anything else that is real.

Hence, we must agree with

Zeller that
those who charge the Stoics with inconsistency for calling God
at one time Reason, at another Soul of the Universe, at another
Destiny, at another Fire, Ether, or even the Universe, forget
that they are attaching to these terms a meaning entirely different from that in which they were used.60
And how were they used?

To signify various aspects of the one

fiery substance intermingling with and penetrating all things.
God, then, is the ultimate and basic matter of the universe
constantly expressing itself in various forms.
God is prime matter in action.
not the same
an~

uninformed~

In other words,

However, this prime matter is

quo of Aristotle, but it is matter,

quod, as being replete with force and complete in itself.
From this Stoic logic it must follow that the system

was completely pantheistic.

The only reality was contained in

matter and the productive power which formed the matter into
the individual objects.

But this reality was called the deity.

God, therefore, was the world, and the world was God.

Or, as

Cicero says: "hunc nmndum ••• animantem esse et Deum.tt61
Everything that exists, therefore, is part of the deity.
Even in speaking of "gods" the Stoics do not contradict their
basic explanation of deity.
60
61

The term "gods" merely indicates

Zeller, Stoics, E~icureans, and Sceptics, 155
De Nat. D. 2.!7.4
---
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special phases or manifestations of the monistic material principle of Being which is "revealed either in the stars or in the
forces of nature.n62
In conclusion, the Stoic physics was monistic, materialistic, and pantheistic.

God for the Stoics was the basic

material element, Fire, changing itself into the various forms
of material substances that exist in the world about us, although he is never distinct or separate from these substances.

_ ...

____ _

The foregoing presentation has given the basic concepts held by various schools of thought concerning the nature
of the deity.

It has studied, also, the sources of these con-

cepts in the science of physics.

It was these same schools

that exercised their power over Seneca, and, it is to be supposed, molded his ideas of philosophy.

An investigation of

Seneca's own philosophical essays and letters will now prove
whether his concept of the deity was patterned after any of the
systems already explained, or whether he chose select bits of
each system to assist him in expounding whatever ethical point
he was discussing at the moment.
Further, these ideas will be weighed against Seneca's
thoughts on the basic organization of the universe.
62

Weber, 143

Both of
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these, in turn, will be measured against the philosophies explained in this chapter.

By comparing the relation of Seneca's

theology and physics with one another, and, then, with the
ideas complied in this chapter, we should be able to decide the
nature of the Senecan Supreme Being without fear of contradiction.

CHAPTER IV
SENECA SPEAKS
In Seneca's many essays and letters there are certain
points that are immediately clear, but a good number are almost impossible to catalogue even after many readings.
was definitely a Roman philosopher.

Seneca

As "Roman" stood for prac-

ticality and "Roman philosopherrt for ethician or moralist, we
know what broad pattern Seneca is to follow in his works.

He

treats of Physics, it is true, but he cares little for that
subject in itself.
Per

~

And in Logic he has no interest whatsoever.

he is interested only in happiness and how man can best

achieve it.
Any study of Seneca that lies beyond this focal point
meets with immediate difficulties.

As was mentioned earlier,

problems arise because of Seneca's lack of system, incoherency,
and inconsistency.

We need only recall that these three are

not insurmountable barriers.

The first and the second can be

eltminated by exhaustive research and by compilation of the
matter pertaining to the thesis topic; the third is overcome by
analysis.

This present chapter is concerned primarily with

this third problem.

The complete list of passages found help-

ful in arriving at the solution of the problem can be found in
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the appendix of this thesis.

Here we will analyze the termin-

ology that gives rise to Seneca's inconsistency and resolve the
obscurity by certain deductions.
The beginning of all confusion occurs when Seneca seems
to postulate four great powers in the world: Fate, Nature, Fortune, and God.

In no one place does he pause to tell us in

what or of what the essence of these

11

beingstt consists.

For

Seneca always addressed his essays to a particular individual
who, we presume, lmew what Seneca implied in each instance.
With us, however, it is different.

When Seneca speaks of For-

tune as a force against which there is no defence,

11

Nullus au-

tem contra fortunam inexpugnabilis murus est ;ttl of Nature as th
power that gives us our life, "Non tam benignum ac liberale
tempus natura nobis dedit, ut aliquid ex illo vacet perdere; 112
of Fate as the ruler of life's span, "Alium alio tempore fata
comprehendunt, neminem praeteribunt ; 113 of God as the most powep.
ful of beings, "deus ille maxinms potentissimusque ipse vehi t
omnia,n4 we have apparently four distinct supreme forces in the
universe.

By merely following the individual usage of the

sixty to one hundred references to these terms in Seneca's
works we could possibly draw that conclusion.

However, in the

Fourth Book of the De Beneficiis Seneca indicates the identity
1
2
3
4

Ep. Mor. 74.19
Ep. Mor. 117.32
Ad Polyb. 11.4
Ep. Mor. 31.10
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of all these terms.

We are amazed to discover that these are

not four powers at all, but only one.
V.fuen Seneca says that God really implants in us our
talents ("magisterque ex occulto deus producit ingeniatt5), some
one offers the objection that nature bestows these on him. 6
To this Seneca replies: "Non intellegis te, cum hoc dicis, nrutare nomen deo?

Quid enim aliud est natura quam deus et di-

vina ratio toti mundo partibusque ejus inserta?n 7

He adds that

"nee natura sine deo est nee deus sine natura, sed idem est
utrumque, distat officio."B

Later God is called Fate when

Seneca says: "Rune eundem et Patum si dixeris, non mentieris;
nam cum fatum nihil aliud sit quam series implexa causarum,
ille est prima o:nmium causa, ex qua ceterae pendent .n9

The

most important statement, however, comes as a summary of the
preceding quotations.

"Sic nunc naturam voca, fatum, fortunam;

onmia ejusdem dei nomina sunt varie utentis sua potestate.nlO
Fate, Fortune, and Nature all stand for the same God.

The

difference in name does not mean a multiplication of beings.
Seneca makes this clear by using his own name as an example.
11

Si quod a Seneca accepisses, Annaeo te debere diceres vel Lu-

cio, non creditorem mutares, sed nomen, quoniam, sive prae5
6
7
8
9

10

De
De
De
De
De
De

Ben.
Ben.
Ben.
Ben.
Ben.
Ben.

4.6.6
4.7.1
4.7.1
4.8.3
4.7.2
4.8.3
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nomen ejus sive nomen dixisses sive cognomen idem tamen ille
est.nll

As Seneca is just one and the same person whether you

call him Lucius, Annaeus, or 3eneca, so God is the same whether
you call him Fate, Fortune, Nature, or God.
Before we can understand the full meaning of God for
Seneca, therefore, we must consider the many individual references to Fate, Nature, and Fortune, as well as to God, in his
letters and essays.

This plan is necessitated by the fact that

Seneca nowhere gives a direct definition for any of these important words.

From their various applications we must attempt

to deduce the one basic meaning attached to these words.

This

idea will either give or lead to the nature or essence of God,
the "maximus potentissimusquett Being of the universe.

In the

following sections of this chapter the terms Fate, Nature,
Fortune, and God will be examined in an effort to capture the
one significant note attached to each by t"1eir author.
SECTION A
FATE
Seneca gives fewer references to Fate in his writings
than to the other terms to be studied, but he comes closer to
giving an exact definition for this word than he does for the
others.

There are three notes that seem to be the outstanding

characteristics of Fate.
11

De Ben. 4.8.3

It springs from a central cause, is
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inexorable, and deals with man's span of life.

Fate more

fundamentally is interpreted as an inexorabl.e course of events
in a

~uman

being's life; these events flow from a central cause

and terminate only with death.
In the Quaestiones Naturales Seneca says that one is
not wrong in calling God by the name of Fate.

"Vis illum fa tum

vocare, non errabj_s • 11

est, ex quo sus-

He then continues:

pensa sunt omnia, causa causarum. 1112

11 Hic

Here obviously God viewed

as Fate is looked upon as woven from the succession of causes
flowing from this first cause.
ex quibus nectitur fatum.ul3

"Dicimus seriem esse causarum
Then, once the course of events

is set into motion there is no drawing back.
Cursum inrevocabilem ingressa ex destinate fluunt. Quemadmodum rapidorum aqua torrentium in se non recurrit nee moratur
quidem quia priorern superveniens praecipitat; sic ordinem fati
rerum aeterna series rotat, cujus haec prima lex est; stare
decreto • 1 4
As if this description would not satisfy his reader, Seneca
repeats the question and the answer.
fatum?

"Q.uid enim intelligis

Existimo necessitatem rerum omnium actionumque, quam

nulla vis rumpat.ttl5

But Seneca reserves his strongest language

to impress Polybius with the immutability of Fate.
12
13
14
15

"Diutius

Fredericus Haase, ed., Annaei ~enecae Opera, Leipzig, B.G.
~eubner, 1887, Quaest. Nat. 2.45.2
Ep. Mor. 19.6
Quaest. Nat. 2.35
Quaest. Nat. 2.36
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accusare fata possumus, mutare non possumus. Stant dura et inexorabilia; nemo illa convicio, nemo fletu, nemo causa movet;
nihil umquam ulli parcunt nee remi ttunt. "16
In all these quotations Seneca has indicated that Fate
signifies the original cause, as well as the succession of
causes, of a series of

unchanr~eable

events.

These notions,

however, are incomplete until we understand over what events
Fate exercises its power.

Does Seneca believe that everything,

including man's will, has been determined ad unum ever since
the succession of causes was set in motion?

Definitely not.

In very striking fashion practically all Seneca's remaining
references to Fate deal with the inevitability of death.
is our fate.
ence.

This

This is the inexorable end to every man's exist-

A succession of causes leads us to the completion of

life's span whether we wish to die or not.

"Alium alio tempore

fata comprehendent, neminem praeteribunt.nl7
Nothing can be added to life's span or subtracted from
it.

"Eunt via sua fata nee adiciunt quicquam nee ex promisso

semel demunt.n18

Thus, it makes no difference who the person

mlght happen to be.
a young friend, died.

Seneca was surprised when Annaeus Serenus,
He muses that "hoc unum mihi occurrebat,

minorem esse et multo minorem, tamquam ordinem fata
16
17
18
19

Ad Polyb. 4.1
Ad Polyb. 11.3
Ad Marc. 21.6
Ep. Mor. 63.14

servarent~
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In like manner old men think that they are younger than they
really are, and believe that death is thus staved off, but
Seneca says: "Mendacio sibi blandiuntur et tam lib enter se
fallunt quam si una fata decipiant." 20 nlus·young and old
alike are taken from this world when their fixed and unchangeable date of death arrives.

We might as well be reconciled to

this ltfate" because "stat quidem terminus nobis, ubi illum inexorabilis fatorum necessitas fixit.n21
Fate and God, therefore, are the same being, but Fate
is, in this instance, merely one phase or manifestation of
~~is

God's essence.

manifestation centers itself on the

necessity of death for every human being.

This idea is ex-

pressed in various ways and in different relations to God, but
the meaning never changes.
first cause.

Our life springs from God, the

Then through a succession of causes we lead our

life and are finally brought to a death that is called nremorseless" or "inexorable" because no one can avoid it.

Fate

merely expresses the inevitability of death that flows from
the very essence of human nature.

Fate, therefore, is not

something distinct from God, and does not have any separate
existence.

It is first of all used by Seneca to describe the

definite limitation placed upon a creature's extstence by
reason of his human essence or nature.
20
21

De Brev.

v.

11.1

Ep. Mor. 101.8

Then, when considered
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in itself, it signifies the first cause of all men and events
of life.

And these events lead inescapably to man's departure

from. life.
SECTION B
:NATURE
:Nature is a term found in Seneca's writings more than
sixty times with a variety of possible interpretations.

Seneca

says that we would commit no fault in calling God by this name.
"Vis illum naturam vocare; non peccabis. n 22
iately follows.
vivimus.n23

The reason innned-

"Hie est ex quo nata sunt omnia, cujus spiritu

:Nature, therefore, is God considered as the source

of life and the principle of its continuation.

This seems a

simple concept until one analyzes the many functions and characteristics of Nature.

It is then that all ideas of a per-

sonal creator and divine providence are replaced by the vagueness and confusion of a materialistic world.

It is then that

one begins to foresee what the Supreme Being will ultimately be
discovered to be.
Nature is the life-giving principle in the world.

"Na-

tura subolem novam gignitn24 and took thought of us before
bringing us into existence.25
22
23
24
25

Quaest.
Quaest.
De Ben.
De Ben.

Nat. 2.45.2
Nat. 2.45.2
1.11.1
6.23.6

Each one when brought into the
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world receives his own special character W}lich it :i.s hard to
change, as "naturam quidem mutare difficile est, nee licet seme
mixta nascentium elementa convertere.n 2 6

No one can blame Na-

ture for his condition, however, because man is not a hasty or
purposeless creation,27 but is such a marvelous creature that
among the greatest of her works Nature has none of which she
can more boast. 2 8 The main reason for this is man's intellect.
Having this he surpasses all beings and needs nothing more.29
Still, Nature was lavish in bestowing many other faculties on
man since we have received our feet and eyes from her as well.3
Together with these faculties Nature produced
freedom.31

~en

in health and

And all this came to man from Nature so that he

needs little else for happiness.32

As for happiness, that is

ac~ieved by a man ttqui natura magistra uti tur"33 and has as his

definite aim "secundum naturam suam vivere.tt34

However, if one

works against Nature, his life is no different from that of one
who struggles against the very order of things.35
If into a man's life material adversities should come,
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

De Ira 2.20.2
De Ben. 6.23.6
De Ben. 6 .23.7
De Ira 1.17.2
Ep. Ivior. 55.1
Ep. Mor. 94.56
Ad Helv. 5.1
Ep. Mor. 45.9 .
Ep; Mor. 41.9
Ep. Mor. 122.19
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however, he will merely say: "Non vides qualem nobis vitam
rerum. natura promiserit, quae primum nascentium hominum fletum
esse voluit?" 36

After all, when death or captivity or disaster

comes, none of them is unexpected, for we always knew in what
disorderly company Nature had confined us. 37 A man naturally
expects some difficulties and he recognizes that every hardship
that time brings comes by a law of Nature. 3 8
Misfortune, moreover, strikes harder at some men than
at others.

When that happens, people should understand that

those who are treated most kindly by Nature are those whom she
removes early to a place of safety.39

It might be best that

such a man die at once, but Nature did give us the means to
cope with whatever problem besets us.

"Ad quaecumque nos coge-

bat instruxit.n 4 0

And not the least of our equipment is fortitude of spirit. 41
Life, besides, will not last forever.

Nor does Nature

testify that she exempts any man from this law of death, for
"natura nulli se necessitatis suae gratiam facturam esse testata est.u42

For the man who has been crushed by material

losses Natura has given a great blessing in her law of death.
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Ad Polyb. 4.3
De Tranq. An. 11.6
De V. B. 15.5
Ad Marc. 22.3
Ep. Mor. 90.16
Ep. Mor. 104.23
Ad Polyb. 11.1
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He should rejoice in this discovery of Nature and look forward
to the day of his release from his sorrows.

"O ignaros malorum

suorum quibus non mors ut optimum inventum naturae laudatur expectaturque.n43

If one believes death 1 s release is still too

far distant, he may use any portion of Nature to provide himself
with a means of early departure from life.
Nemo te tenet; evade quo visum est. Elige quamlibet rerum
naturae partem, quam tibi praebere exitum jubeas. Haec nempe
sunt elementa, quibus hie mundus administratur, aqua, terra,
spiritus. Omnia ista tam causae vivendi sunt quam viae mortis.44
One very obvious fact stands out in all the foregoing
examples.

Nature, indeed, as was first stated, is the source of

life and the principle of its continuation, but this power is
not distinct from God.

Moreover, we have seen that, over and

above this, Nature is not distinct from man.
sical, human makeup.

It is his own phy-

Nature only means man as viewed from the

standpoint of a creature possessing all the processes of organic life and the principle of growth and change.

Also, by

reason of this type of life man's existence must terminate within a short span of years.

Thus, when Seneca says that Nature

forms man, or gives.him certain traits, or health, or sickness,
or death, he just means that man is born, lives, and dies according to the laws of his physical being.
That, however, is just half the picture.
part of the universe.
43
44

Ad Marc. 20.1
Ep. Mor. 117.23

Man is only

Birth, growth, change, and death all
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play their part in the rest of the world as well.

We receive a.

clue as to Seneca's meaning of Nature in reference to the wide
universe when he says. that we should use any part of Nature we
wish, as earth, water, or air, to put an end to our unpleasant
existence(Ep. Mor. 117.23).

Nature in this sense signifies the

physical and mechanical operation and essence of the world at
large.
In two rather lengthy descriptions of the workings of
the universe Seneca indicates that Nature is merely this same
universe following her own set laws and acting
own principle of being.

a.ccordi~g

to her

Nature, he says, orders the heavens,

changes the seasons, and brings to an end all things
ever existed, while she herself exists forever.

t~at

have

"Scimu.s a. qui-

bus principiis natura se a.dtolla.t; quema.dmodum ordinet mundum,
per qua.s annum vices revocet, quemadmodum omnia. quae usque era.n
cluserit et se ipsam finem sui fecerit.tt45

To change the

seasons and moderate the weather is another of Nature's functions. 46 The planets also are regulated and ordered in their
movements according to laws of Na.ture. 47 In this way
the heavens, the seasons are seen to act according to an ordered arrangement and motion until the time comes for all thin
to be resolved into their original primal fire.

Until that

ti'Tle Nature deals wlth matter as she pleases because she is
45
46
47

Ep. Mor. 93.9
Ep. Mor. 107.8
Ad Helv. 6.7-8
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matter.

"Utatur ut vult suis natura corporibus.«48

We should

recall also that when Nature is about to return to f'ire("recessura in ignem") nothing of ours is destroyed( 11 nihil perire
de nostrott49).

Nature, in this sense, is ·distinct f'rom, al-

though in an earlier explanation the term stood f'or man in his
organic composition.

Here it stands f'or the world viewed as

the principle of' operation.

Nature is the earth, air, planets,

and water continuing to act systematically according to their
own essence until the moment arrives for them to revert by thei
very "nature 11 or essence to the one original substance, primal
fire.

11

Quicquid composit, resolvit.n50
With this explanation of' Nature it is a simple matter

to show the relation between Fate and Nature.

In f'act, Seneca

indirectly mentions their identity by stating that people rail
unjustly at Fate when a young person is carried away in death,
for it is more fair that we obey Nature than that Nature obey
us.

"Objurgamus cotidie f'atum: 'quare ille in medic cursu rap-

tus est?

Quare ille non rapitur?

aliis gravem extendit?'

Quare senectutem et sibi et

Utrum, obsecro te, aequius iudicas te

naturae an tibi parere naturam.n51

Very obviously Seneca uses

these terms in the senses we have already off'ered.
Nature are the same concept ultimately.
48
49
50
51

De Prov. 5.8
De Ben. 4.8.1
Ep. Mor. 30.12
Ep. Mor. 93.1-2

Fate and

For, in reality, by
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complaining of Fate we complain of the inevitability of death
which is part of man's Nature.

Fate, then, expresses the ne-

gation of immortality in man's physical composite, his Nature.
The same holds true if we view the world or the universe
as a whole.

It, too, operates according to a set plan of cause

and effect(Fate) until a time when its principle of operation
(Nature) grows weary of fulfilling

j_ ts

works and returns into

primal fire.52
SECTION C
FORTUNE
Of the four terms under consideration, intangibility
renders Fortune by far the
define.

~oat

difficult to grasp, analyze, and

Here, as before, there are numerous references, some

seventy in number, to th-i_s power in the universe.

In this case,

however, the references have greater extent of application.
They also are used with greater vagueness and in more abstruse
language.

Naturally, there is no statement that even mildly

approaches the form of a definition.

A list of the references

to Fortune included in the Appendix will make clear the variety
of source material to be analyzed and then synthesized into
one compact idea.
The first concept of general impression one receives
when he hears Seneca speak of Fortune is that of adversity.
52

De Ben. 4.8.1
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Fortune seems to forbode evil, material loss, uneasiness, and
dissatisfaction with life.
stern as Fortune.

Even Fate was never pictured as

And Nature appeared in a favorable light, or

was at least viewed indifferently as the existing order of
things.

Not Fortune, however.

beware and guard against.
striking passages.

It is something that man must

This is a tone created by various

Is it really the picture that Seneca wished

to leave, or will an investigation lead one to a different conelusion?
There can be no doubt that Fortune plays an important
part in man's life.

Seneca likes to picture it as a powerful

force which leaves nothing free from assault.

In faet, the

more prosperous or brilliant a thing, man, or the state happens
to be, the more subject it is to decline and destruction.

"Quid

enim est quod non fortuna, cum voluit, ex florentissimo detrahat?

Quod non eo magis adgrediatur et quatiat quo speciosus

fulget.n53

But everyone who puts trust in material things is

bound by this power in some way or other.

"Alium honores, alium

opes vineiunt; quosdam nobilitas, quosdam humilitas premit; quibusdam aliena supra caput

i~mperia

sunt, quibusdam sua; quosdam

exil1a uno loco tenant, quosdam sacerdotia.n54
people life is a complete slavery. 55
53
54
55

Ep. Mor. 91.4
De Tranq. An. 10.3
De Tranq. An. 10.4

For all of these
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This last statement of Seneca, however, is conditioned
by circumstances and a man's frame of mind.

For material riche

and prosperity are ttadventicia et nutum fortunae sequentia.n56
Fortune also exercises her power only over those who desire to
rely on her.

"Non habet, ut putamus, fortuna longas manus;

neminem occupat nisi haerentem sibi. tt 5 7

Even though Fortune

might appear to have assisted a certain individual by providing
great worldly possessions,58 she still threatens him as much as
she had previously assisted him.59

Actually it is just at the

time of success that a man should fear the violence of Fortune
and prepare himself against it.60
It is true that Fortune frequently bestows external
gifts, but it is precisely at this moment that one places himself in Fortune's grasp, for the individual has put his trust
in something other than virtue which alone is the object of
man's existence.
Nam qui aliquid virtute melius putat aut ullum praeter illam
bonum, ad haec quae a fortuna sparguntur, sinum expandit et
sollicitus missilia ejus expectat. Hanc enim imaginem animo
tuo propane, ludos facere fortunam et in hunc mortalium coetum
honores, divitias, gratiam excutere, quorum alia inter diripentium !i1anus scissa sunt, alia infida societate dieisa, alia
magno detrimento eorum, in quos devenerant, prensa.
This is a sad picture of enslavement to "''ortune.
56
57
58
59
60
61

De Constant. 5.7
Ep. Mor. 82.6
Ad Polyb. 18.3
Ep. Mor. 4.7
Ep. Mar. 18.6
Ep. Mar. 74.6-7

It was in-
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evitable; man had made an alliance

w~th

pleasure and refused to

follow virtue alone.
Qui vero virtutis voluptatisque societatem faci t et ne ex aequo
quidem, fragilitate alterius ooni quicquid in altero vigoris
est hebetat libertatemque illam, ita demum, si nihil se pretiosius novit, invictam, sub iujum mittit. Nam, quae maxima
servitus est, incipit illi opus esse fortuna.62
It is good to accept whatever Portune offers, as Seneca himself
did, as long as we remember that these things are transitory
and insecure.

nQ.uicquid a fortuna datum est, tamquam exempto

auctore possideas.n63

Nevertheless, the best policy is not to

trust Fortune at all.

"Numquam ego fortunae credidi, etiam cum

videretur pacem agere.n64

Seneca says this because no man is

crushed by hostile Fortune who is not first deceived by her
smiles.65

But, if favorable Fortune, which also quickly shifts

its favor,66 gets one in her power, she ultimately brings him
to ruin.

"Illi qui munera ejus velut sua et perpetua amaverunt

qui se suspici propter illa voluerunt, iacent et maerent, cu:m
vanos et pueriles animos omnis solidae voluptatis ignaros,
falsa et mobilia oblectamenta destituunt.n67
However, no one needs to place himself in Fortune's
grasp.

We are so constituted that we can and ought to seek

riches within ourselves rather than from fortune.68
62
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indifference to things of Fortune lies true freedom.
exeundum ad libertatem est.
tunae neglegentia.n69

"Ergo

Hanc non alia res tribuit quam for

The best possible way to refuse these

temptings of F'ortune is the remembrance that Fortune has no
power over one's character.70
give she cannot take away.71

After all, what Fortune did not
And, as ueneca has said, true

riches of character and peace of soul are found without the
assistance of external riches and worldly advancement.

In fact,

virtue is the treasure of life, whereas Fortune's "gifts" can
be sources of discomfort, sorrow, and

discot~agement,

insofar

as Fortune modifies the issues of even the best plans.72

Thus

the person with fewer possessions is less subject to Fortune's
blows.73

On the other hand, the man who engages in business on

a gigantic scale is the more subject to Fortune.74
Since there is no place where Fortune cannot assault
anyone[5 the only safe harbor is scorn of the future, a firm
stand, a readiness to receive Fortune's missiles full in the
breast, neither skulking nor turning one's back. 76
man is safe because he has abandoned material things

And this
~d

tected himself within the impregnable wall of philosophy.
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Philasophia circurndanda est, inexpugnabilis munus, quem .for-

tuna multis machinis lacessitum non transit. In insuperabili
loco stat animus, qui externa deseruit.tt 77 However, i.f Fortune
has attempted to do battle with such an individual, she has
always been ignominiously de.feated. 7 8

This wise man never had

to .fear .from Fortune79 nor does he have to retreat .from Fortune
He has nothing to lose .from her. 80 He will parry her blows wit
ease 81 and with a serene mind 82 and an unru.ff~ed spirit83 overcome Fortune by his virtue.84

Since he has defeated Fortune,

there can be no one above the wise man.85

For now the vicis-

situdes o.f life have been subordinated to a higher principle,
that o.f considering all honors, wealth, and material possessicns
as a hindrance rather than an aid to the acquirement o.f true
happiness.

Seneca .felt that he himself had achieved a certain

amount o.f success over Fortune since he despised riches when
86
he had them and also when he lost them.
Over and above this,
his contempt .for her power extended into the entj_re realm o.f
Fortune.

11

Totum .fortunae regnum despiciam. 11 87. In this way he

intimates that he has arrived at the state o.f bliss he is
preaching in his many treatises, although he explicitly states,
77
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in all humility, that he is still far from the goal of perfect
happiness which is derived from the practice of all the virtues.
In all the preceding quotations the diversity of Fortune's activities becomes apparent.

Still, beneath all this

there shines forth a certain unlty.

Fortune ls some force

which assaults everything in the world, 88 especially people who
place their trust in worldly honors and material possessions.
It is also a power capable of bestowing these gifts on mankind.89

It seems, therefore, that Fortune is nothing more than

the changing circumstances in a man's life.

rrhe stress, how-

ever, is very definitely placed on the loss of honors and possessions.

For these are more subject to human fickleness,

weakness, and malice.

Whereas these material goods are more

liable to be lost, peace of soul can be permanent because the
virtuous or wise man does not rely on anything material.

He

knows that true riches are to be found within his own heart,
while external, material things are purely transitory.
This is the summation of all Seneca's references to
Fortune, but still we ask, "v'Vhat is lt'ortune?"

Is it a material

force in the universe exercising its power over human puppets?
Is it a person controlling the destinies of his creatures?
is it merely a name given loosely by Seneca to indicate the
88
89
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loss of material things or to point out oecurrences which are
without apparent meaning and explanation? 90

This last seems to

be most logical from all the foregoing passages, but it is also
the most difficult to fit into any pattern with the conclusions
arrived at in the analysis of Fate and Nature.

Seneca, as

stated before, nowhere answers this question himself.

What

Fortune means to him is best stated in the oft repeated quotation: "Sic nunc naturam voca fatum, fortunam; omnia ejusdem
dei nomina sunt varie utentis sua potestate.n91

And this re-

ference cannot be fully understood until all four terms are
examined, especially in the light of Seneca's words on the import~t

word deus.

Fortune, in particular, has a real meaning

and existence only when identified with deus.92

It is impos-

sible, therefore, to reach any further conclusion until the
last word under consideration is studied in completest detail.
SECTION D
GOD

When cataloguing all the references Seneca gives to
the deity, one is immediately conscious of two things, his
practicality and apparent lack of exactness and consistency.
Seneca is practical because he was a moralist above all else.
But also, as is the case with many men who do not have clear
90
91
92
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concepts of very fundamental principles, Seneca's explanations
were directed to the solution of an immediate case without
attempting to reconcile his present answer to a previously elaborated explanation on somewhat the same matter.
Seneca speaks at times almost as if he had been a disciple and believer in Christianity, perhaps through the teaching of the apostle St. Paul.

He says, for instance, that God,

who is the Father of us all, has placed ready to our hands thos
things which he intended for our own good; he did not wait for
any search on our part, and he gave them to us voluntarily. 93
As a benefactor, then, he would be greater than the recipient
of his gifts, but Seneca elsewhere states that man is on a
level with God if he only possesses perfect reason. 94 According to Christian thought it is impossible to reconcile any
equality between God and man.

1hus, Seneca adds to his and our

confusion by speaking on the one hand of the Patherhood of God,
and then on the other of the equality of man and God in all but
immortality.95

Having in mind the solution of people's prob-

lems, Seneca very likely gave no thought to the inconsistency
that arose in his doctrines.

Or, if he did consider such dis-

crepancies, he knew of no way to solve the difficrtlties wh.ich
he himself unknowingly proposed.

We find a typical example in

the case of the same God who previously, unasked, lavished his
93
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gifts on us, failing to heed our earnest prayers. 96

Later on

Seneca changes this attitude when he argues that people would
not supplicate God if he were deaf and ineffectual, or if his
benefits were not bestowed on those who sought them.97

God in

one instance hears our prayers and even grants our desires before we ask for anything.

With equal definiteness in another set

of circumstances we hear him saying it is a waste of time to pra-y
to God, for he will not hear or answer our petitions.
The only possible way to arrive at a well-defined picture of the deity in the midst of these contradictions is to
list whatever attributes Seneca assigns to his Supreme Being
and determine the spiritual or material essence whence these
powers flow.

The investigation will reveal, in other words,

what God does and what God is.
The deity of Seneca resembles in many ways the God of
the Christians in the manifestation of his qualities.

First

of all, God is the master builder of the universe who preserves
all things by his power and "conservat art if ex fragili tat em
materiae vi sua vincens.n98

Still, he does not violate the

course of Fate, or the series of cause and effect, once he has
ordained the definite nature of a certain creature. 99
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agenteulOO the universe moves on its prearranged schedule and
nmanent cuncta, non quia aeterna sunt, sed quia defenduntur
cura regentis.nlOl

In this function God evidently is "omnia

habentem, o:rnnia tribuentem, beneficum gratis. nl02

Manifesting

this care for his creatures, "Deus qnoque quaedam munera universo humano generi dedit, a quibus excludltur nemo.nl03

For

a moment, too, Seneca wishes us to ponder how much God, our
loving parent, has given to us.l 0 4

For in t~e world about us

the artifex has cared that each object has its om1 distinctive
features(ttnulli non et color proprlus est et flgura sua et
ma,-snitudoul05).

And certainly it must be attributed to the

remarkable genius o:f the divine creator that amid all this
106
abundance there is no repetition.
Upon man in particular the deity wished to pour his
favors.

To him he gave the wonderful faculty of ratio by

which man partoolc of the nature of God himself and became the
lord of the world.

ttDuas deus res dedit, quae illum obnoxium

validissimum facerent, rationem et societatem; itaque qui par
esse nulli posset, si seduceretur, rerum potitur.nl07

Having

given this fellowship with himself, God has greater watch over
100
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rational creatures.

"Nihil deo clusum est.

Interest animis

nostris et co~itationibus mediis intervenit.nl08

And there

God is tb.e "malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator et custos.nl09

Moreover, to show his interest in mankind he disci-

plines those whom he loves 110 when they have need of' a stimulus
to practice virtue.
Af'ter listening to Seneca speak of the deity in this
fashion, one f'eels that God is truly parens noster, guiding us
wl th a loving hand in the whole span of our lif'e.

We have

visions of a personal, kind, loving f'ather providentially controlling tne events of' our lif'e and we seek to know yet more
about him.

Seneca gives one reason to wonder and then to doubt

about the truth of this picture, however, because he hesitates
to say what God actually is, and then even describes him in a
very materialistic tone.

Seneca states openly that our in-

tellectual faculty will tell us what the gods are.
di qualesque declarat(ratio) .ulll
what his reason has pointed out.

"Quid sint

Still, he does not explain
Certainly it is the part of'

a wise Y'l.an, which Seneca was striving to become, to study the
universe, its beginnings, and its artifex.

Thus he asks with
11112
amazement: "Non quaeram quis sit istius artif'ex mundi?
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But he passes on without studying the artifex mundi.

In

another place he expresses asain the importance of knowing
God's essence,ll3 but fails to say more on the subject.

The

same question is introduced in other passages 1 14 with the same
result.
Certainly even with Seneca's lack of directness all
that has just been mentioned leads to one conclusion thus far.
Vfuen God possesses, allots, bestows, controls, views, corrects
everything in the universe, we have attributes that uni:t;e perfectly to form a spiritual ttrectorem custodemque universi, animum ac spiritum mundi, operis hujus dominum et artificem.ull5
Moreover, when asking what the one true cause was, Seneca responds "ratio scilicet faciens, id est deus.ull6

Besides "sa-

cer intra nos spiritus sedet, 11117 who again is God, since Seneca
has just finished saying that

11

prope a te deus, tecum est, intus

est.nll8
This language, taken in itself, tells clearly enough
that Seneca believed in the spiritual essence of God.

If God

is the causa or animus or ratio faciens or sacer spiritus, then
Seneca seems to be following the Christian concept of God.
113
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casual observer w·ould im..rneqiately concur in this opinion since
Seneca says in several letters that there are corporeal and incorporeal beinss, 119 and that our intellect is capable of fixing its attention on the incorporeal. 120

Seneca maintains also

that nduo esse in rerum natura ex quibus omnia fiant, causam et'
materiam.nl 2 1

Matter lies inert, ready for any use, but surely

to stay as it is if not acted upon the Efficient Cause.

For

"causa aut em, id est ratio, materiam format et quocumque vult
versat, ex illa varia opera producit.nl22
as we have seen, is God.
repeats this.

11 Universa

This causa or ratio,

Later on in this same letter Seneca
ex materia et ex Deo constant ••. Poten-

tius autem est ac pretiosius quod facit, quod est deus, quam
materia patiens dei.ul23

God, therefore, is distinct from

matter and is the Cause forming matter.

Since another name for

causa is ratio and deus, one still retains the concept of the
spirituality of God's essence.

The answer would be reached and

the investigation completed if Seneca had stopped here.
did not.

But he

For again we are confronted with a series of contra-

dictionS"' that demand further study.
Whereas up to this point God has been covered with the
robe of spirituality, we now discover

t~e

changing the original hues of this robe.
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shadow of materialism
Seneca had admitted
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the distinction between corporeal and incorporeal substances,
leading one to think that he acknowledga:i the existence of a
spiritual essence or nature in the deity.

However, following

his usual line of inconsistency, Seneca denies his previous
statements by recognizing the existence of material or corporeal substances only.

He does not directly postulate this

in a·'l.y one place, bPt the numerous sugeestj..ons to and appli.

cations of such a principle leaves no doubt
lieved it to be true.

~ut

that he be-

The general principle w' lich Seneca

follows assumes that whatever is capable of acting or being
acted upon alone is possessed of any reality.

The contention

that only corporeal objects exist is reached by restricting the
power of acting or being acted upon to purely material things.
God, as the ruler, guardian, soul, breath, lord, and
master-builder of the world, possesses force and power at his
command.

The very names used to describe God signify his po-

sition and his activity.

But for Seneca "cui tanta vis est ut

impellat et cogat et retineat et inhibeat, corpus est.nl24
This, indeed, is not the only passage which shows that the dei
j_s nothing more than matter.

For Seneca reaffirms his con-

vic.tion that whatever possesses the principle of activity is
purely material and does not rise above anything else in the
universe.
124
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This sets the stage for a very similar statement in a subseq-~Jent

letter, in which he writes: "Quidquid facit, corpus

est.n 126

Since God under his many titles is ultimately the

causa efficiens, t 11.en, he too j_s material in essence because,
again, everything which acts is material.
Seneca comes yet closer to this position when he affir
in Letter 95: "Omne hoc quod vides, quo divina atque humana
conclusa sunt, unum est; membra sumus corporis magni. 11 127
Whatever exists, therefore, whether it be God or man is of the
same nature as anything else that exists.
They are not only of the same nature.

More than this.

They are also extensions

of the same body, not even possessing the quality of strict
individuality.

Seneca has to admit this because in answer to

his own question as to whether matter is continuous, full, and
all-pervading, or separated and mixed in with Void he says that
"nihil usque inane est.nl28

"Body" thus spreads continuously

throughout the universe without rip or gap.

The universe, in

reality, is the sole existing reality, consisting of matter,
which is divided into divina and humana according to the varying aspects under which we are viewing the universe.
We find the same idea contained in yet another passage.
Seneca holds again that "totum hoc, quo continemur, et unum est
126
127
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129
et deus,· et soc1"i· sumus et me11nbra."
.

It 1"s not s u r pr1s
· J.Llg
·

to find him making the universe one continu::ms body and callirg
us mere expressions of its multiformity.

However, it would be

difficult to accept the statement that deus is actually the
material, corporeal universe unless we had the explanation by
Seneca himself in the passa0e already referred to and in his
rather general, though, we must aci.mi t, clear confess ion that if
nvis illum vocare mundum, non falleris.n 130
0eneca also links the words deus, mundus, and rector
universi into one picture to sienify their mater:tality. "Nam
mundus quoque cuncta complec·tens rectorque universi deus in exteriora quidem tendit, sed tamen introrsum undique in se
redit.nl31

The passage conveys the idea

t~at

the world, which

is God, by a series of mutations produced other objects and
then by a reverse process resolved them again into itself.
Upon occasion God was also called parens nosterl32 as
if he were our begetter, protector, and benefactor.

To give

an even more personal touch Seneca gave the author of the universe the name Pater Liber because he was then to be taken
specifically as our begetter: nquia omnium parens sit.nl33
Yet this same term parens is applied to the mundus when Seneca
129
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writes: "Unus omnium parens mundus. est." 134

If these quotation

are taken as Seneca gave them to us, there can be no question
that deus and mundus are one and the same concept.

Different

names are used merely to point out the various functions of the
one great world body.

God is divested of all personal paternit

and woven into a nameless mass for which "nomina proprie aptabis vim aliquam effecturnque caelestium rerum continentia.nl35
God's names, therefore, are as endless as the operations of the
universe.
Several furth.er investigations, while not as concl1.1sive
as those already offered, can be construed to signify the materialistic tone beneath Seneca's words.

In urging Lucilius

to accent w-"latever span of life is assigned to him Seneca would
have his "mae;nus animus deo pareat et quicquid lex universi
jubet, sine cunctatione patiatur.nl36

Unless we wish to twist

Seneca's words into meaning that there are two supreme powers,
deus and lex universi, we must conclude that the two are again
just Seneca's way of saying the same thing in slightly altered
language to suit the situation.

The lex universi means, accord

ing to the context, the order and re1c;u_larity of the universe
itself, which ordains all creatures to complete their earthly
span at some destined time.
134
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ttquodannnodo se habens."

vVh.en we obey God, therefore, ·vve are

also endurlng whatsoever the unlverse is ordering.

Again God

is taken as the universe.
~.triving

to elevate the nature of man Seneca has un-

consciously destroyed the lofty positlon of his deity.

In

many passages Seneca stresses the dignity of man to such an extent he makes him an equal to God in all save immortall ty • 137
In one outstanding passage we find: "Haec duo(deus, homo) quae
rationalia sunt, eandem naturam habent, illo diversa sunt, quod
alterum irrm·ortale, alterum mortale est.ul38

And even this

quality does not affect a man's present security, for "scit non
multum esse ab homine timendum, a deo nihil.tt 139

It stands to

reason that, having nothing to fear from God and having the
same nature, man is not only equal to God, but he is actually
part of the deity.

How this can be possible, since many in-

dividual persons walk the earth, remains for the pantheistic
philosophers to explain.

Seneca does not touch upon this point

Still, with the words found in tl1is selection, man must at the
very least be a manifestation of the deity or a membra dei.
Wnatever pertains, therefore, to the nature of man will autornatically be predicated of God as well.

Likewise, to be lop;i-

cal, we must bestow god-like attributes on man, immortality ex137
138
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cepted.
:More specifically can we evaluate the soul of man from
this same viewpoint.

According to .Seneca

11

Quid aliud voces

hunc(animum) quam deum in corpore humano hospitantem?nl40
soul is God livLt.e; j_n man.
another rhetorical question.

The

In a later letter beneca asks
ttQuid enim est aliud animus quam

quodammodo se habens spiritus?nl41

If one would stop here, he

would interpret s-piritus as an immaterial substance called the
soul.

However, in the very next sentence it is revealed that

tttanto spiritum esse faciliorem omni alia materia, quanto tenuior est.ttl42

The trans:ttion is quite clear.

matter, if in a somewhat rarified form.

T'::1e s-oiritus is

Spiritus is also t"l:le

animus, ~1ich, in turn, is God residing in man.

Or to look at

the same analysis in diagrammatj_c form: Deus - Animus j_n ~
ine- Spiritus- Materia(tenuior).

In one short set of de-

ductions, therefore, we find man and God alike are purely material beine;s.
After this investigation we are now faced with two set
of contradictory explanations.

At one time greater prominence

is given to the spiritual, at another to the material side of
Seneca's conception of God.
140
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listing God as distinct from matter, and speaking of corporeal
and incorporeal substances, would form a spiritual basis for
the Christian attributes predicated of God.

For Seneca calls

God the :Master Builder, and then a lavish benefactor.

Man, in

particular, has received the highest gift possible, his intellect, from God, who then ta1ces up his home in man's soul, marking the good deeds and correcting those souls that he loves.
To offset these spiritual and Christian fundaments of God comes
the astounding revelation that God j_s t:e1e first cause and so is
purely corporeal since Cause for Seneca is active and so is mrle
up of matter.

Going hand in hand vii th this explanation is the

belief that God is parens noster when we understru1d that parens
noster is likewise the world itself.
and materia because the world is an

In fact, we too are deus
~

quid, of w'-,_ich we are

all members, though broue;ht forth in various forms.
God resides in man as his soul.

.t!'inally,

This soul, however, called the

spiritus hominis, is still nothing more than matter, even :Lf it
is in a rarified state.
These are the two pictures placed before us.

It would

be difficult to form any conclusion on the basis of this treatment of deus alone, but, when these explanations are weighed in
view of Seneca's teachings on Fate, Nature, and Portune, and in
the light of his whole philosophical background, a definite
answer is made possible.

n1e following chapter will determine

whether the spiritual or the material is the correct conception

95
of the deity by seeing which is t'ne more compatible with the
other three terns Seneca used as synomyms for deus, and by
deciding which is the more consistent with 0eneca 1 s philosophical background and his other philosophical beliefs.

r
CHAPTER V
DECISION RENDERED
After the consideration of Seneca's use of deus in the
preceding chapter one can understand why it is possible to confuse the nature of the divinity.

However, because of the in-

vestigation made previously into Seneca's philosophical background and into the terms used synonymously with

~~

we can

be certain that we have discovered the meaning Seneca intended
for God when we say
verse itself.

~

is nothing more than the material uni-

Seneca's philosophy, therefore, must be called

materialistic and pantheistic.

In reality, then, Seneca, dif-

fers in no way from the Stoics that preceded him.
brief

rdsum~

By giving a

of the basic ethical and metaphysical concepts at

stake, and by reconsidering the terms Fate, Nature, Fortune,
and God in their connection with Seneca's philosophical background, the correctness of this decision will become apparent.
As the last chapter stated, the basic meaning of the
word deus cannot be reached by knowing the usage of that solitary word.

However, from that word alone one can start the

analysis into the materiality or spirituality of God's nature.
For, in spite of the inconsistent wording in applying the term
deus, Seneca did leave a clue to the ultimate nature of God.
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If one will only review the analysis of deus, ':le will find that
when God is performing some action the spiritual side of his
nature is more in focus.

God creates, preserves, assists, cor-

rects, and loves all his creatures.

By these activities the

picture of a personalized and rationalized God is given to us.
On the other hand, when Seneca uses more basic concepts we have
stronger arguments for the materiality of God.

For only ma-

terial things exist, the world is our Father and is God, and
the universe is the whole of which everything else is out a
part.
Even. if we had not said definitely as yet what God is,
we could tentatively draw certain conclusions from the foregoing
paragranh.

For the spiritual aspect of God results from the

operations of God.

The quotations t'aemselves show that in this

activity God j_s considered from an ethical standpoint.

However,

in the field of metaphysics we notice the materiality of God's
essence.

For we remember that only corporeal thinR:s exist and

that God is the universe which diffuses itself into many different shapes and activities.

It is at just this very point

that the inconsistency of Seneca regarding the deity shows itself in boldest outline.
dicts

t~1e

His ethical treatment of God contra-

physical and metaphysical concept of the same deity.

Since the field of ethics presupposes the study of metaphysics,
we can presume, on this count, that Seneca held the materiality
of all things, including God.
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By reconsidering Fate, Nature, and

~ortune

we discover

that there is nothing which is inconsistent with this material
view of God's essence, but that there is nothing to favor any
Christianized interpretation of these words.

We

~>.ave

seen that

Fate is called the first cause and the chain of causes that
flows from it in a series of unchangeable events.

Since the

first cause for Seneca is t-r1e causa efficiens, and, since whatever acts is material, this first cause is also material.

Na-

ture, again, is taken under a double aspect of materiality.

It

is meant to signify, first of all, t:ne physical universe as a
life-givi:r1g principle and then as the universe itself in its
physical makeup.

Secondly, Nature stands for an individual

man's human nature as it exists after
life-giving principle.

j_ ts

formation by this

Stnce, in this light, man's nature is

just an efflux or a manifestation of Nature in its broader aspect, it too is just as material as the source of its existence
Besides, the universe can only be corporeal because it is the
ultimate principle of existence, endowed wl.th activity.

As

such the universe must follow Seneca's premise that "quidquid
facit, corpus est.nl
The problem of giving intrinsic meanings to Fortune almost defies solution.

However, since the references to ~ortune

occur most freq;_J_ently in passages complaining of the loss of
material possessions, the most common concept for lt,ortune is

1

Ep. Mar. 117.2
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nothing more than the ebb and flow of wealth and worldly goods.
Whether Seneca meant anything else wr1en speaking of Fortune no
one apparently has ventured to say.

Few will go even as far as

Arnold does when he says Fortune "has no existence in the absolute sense of.the term.

But in practical life, and from the

limited point of view of the individual concerned, fortune is
everywhere met with." 2

Moreover, just how this term assists in

the interpretation of the deity is not at all as certain as the
other terms applied by Seneca to the Supreme Being.

Yet,

Seneca obviously saw some connection between Fortune and God,
for, otherwise, how could he make the statement: ttsic nunc naturam voca fatum fortunam; omnia ejusdem del nomina sunt varie
utentis sua potestate"? 3 In some sense this quotation mj_ght
be construed to signify the material universe insofar as the
things acquired and lost are all material possessions and part
of the universe.

If the universe is another name for God, then

the increase or loss of one's possessions could more poetically
be called the favor or onslaught of Fortune.

Moreover, this

argument is in line with the general usage of Fortune, which
implies harshness, lack of feeling, uneasiness, insecurity, and
evil.

These ideas certainly contradict the ethical concept of

God proposed by Seneca, for that deity is to be loving, guiding,
and provident.
2
3
4

Nor can he harm anyone since he is all-good.4

Arnold, 209
De Ben. 4 • 8 • 3
Ep. Mor. 75.17
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These notes of foreboding ascribed by Seneca to Fortune, howewer, would st.J.i t an unthinking and unreeling universe tr1at
no care to the individual creatv.res in its domain.
lack of

indivi~.al

~ive

It was this

attention that led Arnold to call Fortune

"the absence of' both tendency and purpose, which results j_n a
constant shif'tlns and fro 11 5 of' one's material possessions.
In anothe-e sense Seneca looks upon Fortune as the unpredictable force giving, or, more especially,. taking away one's
worldly possessions.

We hear nothing more about this force to

learn its nature, but since f'or ;::>eneca any name implying f'orce
indicates God, and since F'ortune is a force, then on this score
also Portune can be called God.

Then we must resort to the

prime principle of all Seneca's physics that whatever acts, or
exerts force, is comprised of' matter.

This again would show

Seneca's idea of Fortune was intimately linked with the notion
of' materiality.
~ore

likely than not Seneca had a conf'used idea of' both

these views in his mind when he spoke of Fortune.

At one time

the idea of' force was more prevalent; at another the shif't of'
material things, as affected by f'orce, received greater stress.
\Vhatever view is adopted, either one is consonant with the materialistic and pantheistic structure of the universe.

In no

way, however, is it possible to adjust Portune to the spiritual
5

Arnold, 199
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istic or the ethical concept of God.
Although Seneca's doctrines and background reflect the
teachings of different schools of philosophy, the 0toic doctrines on the divinity alone resemble the explanations proffere
at random by Seneca to assist in teaching some principle of
life.

T>ne Cynics, it was noted earlier, can be used merely as

a negative norm for Seneca's ideas since for them God was something unknown and remote from mankind.

F'ollowlng the same line

of reasoning, they also considered all worship a matter of contempt.

In contrast to this, however, Jeneca would have people

cultivate the greatest respect toward God.
The Epicureans, even though Seneca showed a special
predilection for certain doctrines they proposed, based their
notions abm:t God on other concepts which Seneca perforce could
not follow.

The Epicureans' physics postulated atoms and void

as the ultimates of the universe, whereas Seneca held the un.iverse to be one large body with no empty spaces interspersed
between bodies.

11 Nihil

usque inane est. 116

In this way the

Epicurean gods were merely a fortuitous cluster of atoms possessed of no power or added dignity.

Opposed to this, Seneca

holds that nothing is separate from the universe.

Whatever

exists is either dtrectly or indirectly part of tnat seamless
body.
6

Contrary also to the Epicurean physics and metaphysics

Quaest. Nat. 3.16.5
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which placed many gods far from rnen in the intermundia and
wnich tried to explain away all necessity of gods, Seneca
brought his God close to men and attempted to make him a powerful force in men's lives.
It is to tbe Sextian and Stoic doctrines that a marked
parallel can be seen in Seneca's teachings.

In fact, the analy

sis of Chapter Four resolves itself into the Stoic doctrines
listed in Chapter

,,,

~wo.

In the earlier chapter Stoicism was

found to be materialism and pantheism combined into one.
likewise, must fall into

t~is

Senec~

category because he too expresses

the s&>me sentiments and opinions of the early Stoics.
The Stoics refused to divorce, or even to distine;uish, mind
and matter, or to exalt the soul by opposinr; it to the body.
Hence they asserted that nothing exists which is not cornoreal
or material, though t''ley immediately qualified this statement
by maintaining that there is nothing corporeal ~1ich is passive
or inert and that all activity imnlies a LOGOS or spiritual
principle. The a:Jsolute antagonism of a purely active form and
a purely passive, which is t·ne crux of the Aristotelian philosophy, is thus set aside; and in its place we have the relative
opposition of two elements, both of which a?.>e regarded as
hav:lng ultimately the same nature and origln and both of wh:lch
are viewed as in one aspect, material and in another spiritua~
This is a compendium of the early Stoics and is also a
condensed edition of t'-le doctrines of 0eneca.

For both Zeno

and Seneca admit that t 1J.e only reality is corporeality, which
is everything that acts or is acted upon since this is the
primary note of reality.

And this corporeality or matter is

also possessed of ratio to explain the order in the universe.
7

C aird, 86
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Neither the early Stoics nor Seneca saw, or cared to see, the
patent contradiction between ratio, a spiritual faculty, and
matter as the sole existing reality.

That is why Seneca can in

an emotional moment call God a "sacer intra nos spiritus"8 and
later in calm reasoning write "unus omnium narens mundus est.'' 9
"This fact that the primitive matter is characterized by reason
and activity deprives the Stoic materialism of what would otherwise be a baneful influence, and explains how the Stoic ethics
and also the Stoical theology should be so highly spirit·ualistic
as they unquestionably are.ttlO

Yet, this principle does not

free Stoicism and Seneca from an identical contradictory note
in their teaching, although it does establish the existence of
a closely knit alliance between the author and the school.
Finally, it has been pointed out that both the Stoics
and Seneca hold the ultimate identity of God with the world,
and say that any name denoting God is merely another aspect of
the power-laden matter which comprises the universe.

For, Se-

neca and before him "Zeno taught that God is Body, but it was
not a dead stuff which constituted the world.

The thing which

Zeno was concerned above others to affirm was that this stuff was
actually Reason.

The universe is a living being.nll

These two

notes point out at once the dynamistic materiality of the deity.
8

9
10
11

Mor~ 41.2
De Ben. 3.28.2
Davidson, 93
Bevan, 42

Ep.
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Thus upon a closer analysis the conflict between the
materialistic and idealistic conception of God disappears.

Go~

according to Seneca, is only real when he has a material form.
Therefore, even when he is called animus or ratio, these names
do not exclude but rati.ler uresuppose that these concepts have
bodies.

Seneca, in other words, is only following the tenets

of Stoicism 'llfhen he pronounces it indifferent whether God is
regarded as fatum or divinus spiritus. 12
Nor is it a surprise
after this to understand that ::::eneca is called a Stoic.

For,

although he uses Pythagoras and Ep:i.curus as authorities to pres
home single truths, yet he boasts in over twenty passap;es that
he himself should be labelled a Stoic • 13

l''rom this evidence it

could be presumed quite logically that Seneca, who prized the
na._rne of Stoic to that extent, would be a disciple of t"1is
school in such a basic matter as the ultimate nature of the
universe and of God.
In following this Stoic school Seneca has made it clear
that ultimately there is no difference between God and primary
matter; both are one and the same substance.

)Vhen regarded as

the universal substratum, it is known as just matter, but when
considered as acting force, is
ratio, fa tum, and deus.
essences.
12
13

calle~

spiritus, natura, animus,

Nor are :matter and force distinct

Actually force is inherent in matter.

The force is

Ad Helv. 8.3
Confer the appendix for an elaboration of tills point

I

I
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something material, is identical with matter.

Thus, the dif-

ference mentioned in Chapter Four between efficient cause and
material cause(God and matter) is no more than the difference
between spiritus and its elements, which is no difference at
all.

For, both Stoics and s.eneca maintain that every particular

element has in process of time developed from primary fire, or
God, and to God it will return at the end of every period of
the world.

It is in this sense that Seneca ascribes the name

of Hercules to God "quia vis ejus invicta sit quandoque lassata
fuerit operibus editis, in ignem recessura.ttl4

But, taking the

deity in its full meaning, we have primary matter, as well as
primary force.

The sum total of all that is real is the divine

Breath, moving forth from itself and returning to itself again.
ttDeus in exteriora quidem tendit, sed tamen introrsum undique
in se reoit. 11 15

Therefore, the deity itsel.t' is the primary

fire, the primal substance changing into various individual
eler11ents, and then back into itself.

'vVhen viewed in itself,

the primary material force is the whole of the deity.

However,

the things into which this primary substance has changed are
only indirectly divine and possessed of deity.

Still, in a very

true sense any part of the world may have divinity predicated
of it.

What is not immediately divine is a manifestation of

the original matter.

Then, when everything reverts to the di-

vine material unity, there is no longer any distinction between
what was originally divine and what was a part or a manifes-

14 De
15

De

~en.

v.

4.8.1

B. 8.4
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tation of the divinity.
As a summation of the foregoing we quote Zeller in his
Stoics, Enicureans, and Sceptics.
The Stoics admitted no essential difference between God and the
world. Their system was therefore strictly Pantheistic. The
world is the sum of all real existence, and all real existence
is originally contained in deity, which is at once the matter
of everything and the creative force which moulds this matter
into particular individual substances. ,Je can, therefore,
think of nothine; w~1ich is not either immediately deity or a
manifestation of deity. In point of essence, therefore, God
and the world are the same; indeed, the two conceptions are declared by the Stoics to be absolutely identical. If they have
nevertheless to be distinguished, the distinction is only derivative and partial. The same universal Being is called God
when it is re,::;arded as a whole, World when i. t is regarded as
progressive in the many forms assumed in the course of its development. The difference, therefore, is tantamount to assisning a difference of meaning to the term world, according as it
is used to express the whole of what exists, or only the derivative part.l6
Although the word ttstoics" is employed throughout this quotation, Seneca's name can be supplied without any violation of
meaning since his position in this case is exactly that of the
Stoic school of thou€'-Jlt.

The analysis conducted in Chapter

Four has shown that :::ieneca's words admit this Stoic interpretation without any difficulty.
In view of the many arguments offered we can classify
under four headings the evi.dence which leads one to accept
wi.thout reserve the pantheisti.c nature of Seneca's universe and
the universal materialism of his Supreme Belng.
(1)
16

It is true that the ethical concept of God can be

Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, 156-8
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given a spiritual interpretation; however, rtyou cannot have
ethical doctrine without a basis of Dhysical and metaphysical
doctrine.

You can have no rule of conduct wi tholJ.t some view of

the universe wherein the action is to take place.n

17

Thus, God

used as a :motivation for a good moral life and considered in
his relations to men resembles the God the Christians adored.
Yet, :more basically in the examination of the physical universe
Seneca states his belief in the existence of matter alone.
Nothing, not even God, is excluded from this postulate.
(2)

l''ate, Nature, and Fortune, the synomyms for God,

can all be construed as parts or aspects or special phases of
t·'le material universe, but cannot make sense if t::1ey are to be
endowed wlth a spiritual meaning.
(3)

Althouc;h Seneca's philosophical bacl<:ground was

varied, there is a distinct resemblance between

~is

words on

the deity and those spoken by ·the members of the Stoic school.
And, since the Stoics ar>e commonly known to be materiallsts
and pantheists, thoup-,h in

~eneca's

time the pantheism of the

Stoics did adopt a more personalized concept of the universe
and spoke of God as Creator, Father, and Guardian, so ~eneca's
words can be given a no more elevated meaning than the pantheism they copy.
(4)

The appendix lists more than twenty references to

Seneca's profession of Stoicism.
17

Bevan, 31

From this admission we might
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presume that on such a large j_ssue as the meaning of God he
would agree
filiated.

wit~

the school with

~hich

he indicates he is af-

Of course, this argument taken by itself could prove

nothing, but it helps to strengthen the conclusions already
reached in the first three arguments.
Since all the evidence proposed indicates t"nat Seneca
called himself a Stoic, that his teachings have a materialistic
core, and that his words in all essentials run parallel with
the Stoic concept of God, we can, therefore, classify Seneca
as a true Stoic and discredit any spiritual interpretation of
his words.

No matter how Christian his words may sound upon

occasion, they still retain the ultimate materj_alism and pantheism of the Stoic philosophers.

For the basic explanation

of the world for Seneca never transcends sheer materiality.
Beautiful and stirring though they may be, the words of Seneca
in the last analysis mean no more than the more direct arguments given 6eno to his followers centuries before.

Seneca

may have the enthusiasm of St. Paul and he may parallel the
words of Scripture, but he still remains Seneca the materialist
and pantheist..

And his deity will never be anything more than

the wide sweep of the material universe.

Even though classical

students of every century cease not to wonder how such elevated
language could flow from a mind steeped in Stoicism and are
drawn to find the solution to apparent contradictions and inconsistency, the answer will always be found to be the same.
God is the Universe and the Universe is God.

r
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APPENDIX

SECTION A
FATE
DE PROVIDENTIA

5.6
5.8
5.8

Fate is the set law of t~lings.
We are swept along by Fate
Fate is inexorable; even God is ruled by Fate.

21.6

The I<,ates go theirway and do not add or subtract
from t~1e promised span of life.

11.1

Old men thL~:.k that t~1ey deceive Fate just as they
dece~_ve themselves when they believe they have more
years yet to live.

1.4

.All menhave an end-.- Tlns universality dulls the
cruelty of Fate.
We cannot change Fate.
It is not due to an unjust Fate that we die. We were
only permitted to live in the first place.
The ~ates take all in death sooner or later.

AD MARCIAtvr DE C01\ISOLATIONE

DE BREVITAr.rE VITAE

AD POLYBIUM DE CONSOLATIOi\fE

4.1
11.1
11.3

AD hELVIAM DE CONSOLATIONE

15.3

Fate contrived tha~Helvia would not be with Seneca
in exile.

4.7.2

Pate is a connected chain of causes.

19.6
63.14
76.23
77.12

Fate is woven from a succession of causes.
Fate cares nothing for age.
It just takes men off.
A good man patiently accepts Fate.
Fate arranged the span of life. Do not pray for
more days.
We rail at Fate for cutting off a man's life, but it
is better for us to obey Nature.
Be reconciled to B'ate by which all things are ruled
and dissolved.
Our death is set by remorseless Pate.
The great souled man is one who gives himself over
to Pate.

DE BENEPICIIS
EPISTULAE N10RALES

93.1
91.15
101.7
107.12
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SECTION B
NATURE

5.8
6.8

DE PROVIDEN'l1 IA
Let Nature deal with matter as she pleases.
It is· easy to renounce Nature. Commit suicide.

19.3

DE CONSrrMTTIA
Keep the post-rn life that Nature assigned you.

1.5.3
1.17.2
2.11.4
2.20.2

1.19.1

1.6
7.1
16.1
20.1
22.3

DE IRA
He has the least knowledge of Nature who ascribes the
vice of anger to men.
Nature has given us sufficient equipment in reason to
control our lives.
Nature ordains that that which is great by the fear
it instils in others also fears something else.
It is hard to change Nature since the e'ements combine in us at ')irth.
DE CLEiviENT IA
Power is not harmful if it is according to Nature's
law. For Nature had set up kingship in the case of
the bees and other creatures.
AD Iv~ARCIAIVl DE CONSOLATI0l'TE
Time is Nature's healer of sorrows.
:Nature bids us grieve for our dear ones.
Nature has not dealt grudgingly with woman's nature.
Death is a great discovery of Nature.
Nature treats those most kindly whom she early removes from life.

8.1
15.5

DE VITA BEATA
We must use Nature as ~guide. Reason heeds her.
Every hardsnip comes by a law of Nature.

5.1
5.3

DE OTIO
Nature begot us for--contemplation and action.
Nature begot us to be spectators of her beauty.

7.2
10.2
11.7
15.6

DE TRANQUILLITA'l1E ANINii
Work is in vain where Nature objects.
Nature made ~abit an alleviation for disasters.
Nature hemmed us in with sickness, disaster, but this
is not unexpected.
In misfortune have the measure of sorrow that Nature
(and not custom) prescribes.

r
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DE BnEVITATE VITAE

- 1.1
12.4

Some say Nature is spiteful in giving a short span
of life.
They wastetime and twist Nature who sing or hum their
worthless tunes.
AD POLYBIUM DE CONSOLA'l'IONE

1.1
1.4
4.3

1
-~

10.4-6
11.1
15.3

.,

~

Nature brings all things by her laws to destruction.
Death or the end comes to all by the law of Nature.
This universality dulls the cruelty of this Fate.
Nature has decreed a life of sorrow; man's first act
at birth is to cry.
Nature gives loans, not possessi.ons(for all must die)
No one is exempt from Nature's law of death.
Nature destined Augustus for heaven, out not even he
escaped sorrow.
AD HELVIAIVI DE CO]SOLA'l'IONE

5.1
6.8
10.11

Nature intended that we need little for happiness.
'I'he law of Nature governs raovement of the planets.
Nothing satisfies greed; very little satisfies Natur~

1.1.11
2.29.3

Nature begetsprogeny.
Nature does not suffer certain qualities in same
person; so people complaln.
The heavens fulfill their office in the fixed order
of Nature.
Nature created man and gave him great privileges.

DE BENEFICIIS

4.12.5
6.23.6

EPISTULAE

16.8
22.15
30.11
41.8

,,~!

45.9

i

55.1
66.1

'

It

66.39
78.7
90.16
90.44
93.2
93.8

~:WHALES

Nature's wants are slight; so follow Nature.
It is not Nature's fault that we are worse when we
die than when we were born.
Nature wishes her laws to be ours.
Man's highest good is achieved by living to his own
Nature(rational).
He is happy who conforms himself to the laws of
Nature.
Nature gave us Ollr legs and eyes.
Nature acted unfairly in giving Claranus such a poor
body for such a gifted soul.
Heason is copying Nature.
Nature constructed us so that pain is endurable or is
short.
Nature equ'Lpped us for vi'r1.'atever she enforced on us.
Nature does not give virtue; it is an art to be go.od.
It is fairer for us to obey Nature than it is when
the Fates take off a young man in death.
We are Nature's creditors for having lived.

r
·;
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93.9

1

'

94.56
98.14
104.22
107.8
110.10
116.3
117.23
117.32
119.'3
120.4
122.5
122.19

EPISTULAE TvtORALES
We k2:1ow Natnrels beginrnngs: how she orders the course
of the heavens, changes, and brings to an end. She
is the end of her own existence.
Nature nroduced us in health and freedom; she elevate
our gaze to the skies, not to objects of greed.
VI/hen one strays from Nature, he is a slave to chance.
Nature has given ·us a brave spi_rit to combat all
things.
Nature moderates the world by changi.ng the seasons
and the weather.
We bring forth gOld and silver out of the earth contrary to Nature and thus get the material for our
destruct-ton.
1~ature gave us an interest in our well-being.
Select any part of Nature as a means of death. These
means are to be found in the elements.
Nature has not p;iven us so much tlme that we can
waste it.
Nature wants only her due, nothing more; bread can
be coarse or fine, etc.
Nature gives us not knowledge, but seeds of knowledge
All vices are a rebellion against Nature.
If we follow Nature, all is easy; if not, we row
ap;ainst the current.
SECTION C

FORTUNE

6.6
5.4
5. 7
8.3
8.3
15.3
15.5

3.6.5
3.25.4

DE PHOVIDENTIA
Scorn PortuneTit cannot harm you.
DE C Oi.!STAN'l'IA
Fortune taJcesonly what she !1as given.
Property, etc. are t:dngs at J:!'ortune' s call.
F'ortune always outmatched by virtue.
Man can bear injuries of men, if he can bear those
of Fortune.
Fortune conquers us, unless we conquer her.
Fortune has no place in a poor(wise) man's house.

DE IRA
Fortune is not so-submissive to anyone t~at she always responds.
Fortune cannot harm him who is serene in mind.

·1
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1.1.2
2.6.3
1.1
5.6
10.3
15.1
16.8
20.2
26.6

DE CLEMEHT IA
Fortune proclaims giftts for human beings.
The w:tse man will parry Fortune's strokes.
AD MARC IAM DE CONSDLATIOi'~E
We cannot acquit Portune of Marcia's complaint of
taking away her possessions(children).
An unruffled splrit corrquers Fortune.
Take what .B'ortune gives remembering it is insecure.
l' ortune outrages· the Caesars at times, showing they
have less control over themselves than over others.
Fortune is merciful to Il/larcia even when it is angry.
Fortune sometimes apportions goods unjustly, but
death levels all things.
!v1en are a small part of Portune 1 s domain.
1

25.5

DE VITA BEA'J'A
Indifference ·to Fortune is the escape to fre•3dom.
'Nhoever follows virtue and pleasure begins to depend
on Fortune.
Seneca heeds not Fortune since he despises riches
alike when he has them and vvhen he lacks them.
Seneca desplses the whole domain of Fortune.

5.7

DE OTIO
F'ortune wrecks naught of what Nature has appo5_nted.

4.5
15.3
20.3

DE TRANQ! IJ.LI'l ATE ANIMI
Let not man act as if there is no place w:1ere man
can escape from Portune.
Portune might remove one from high position.
Those wlwm Fortune never regarded are more cheerful
than those she has forsaken.
Reduce your possessions so as to be less exposed to
the injuries of J:'ortune.
Seek riches within yourself, not from Fortune.
All are chained to Fortune.
Llmit your advancement in material riches before
Fortune can decide the end of this advancement.
The wise man never retreats from Fortune because he
has nothing to lose.
A man of many affairs puts himself in Fortune 1 s power.
1

4.2
4.6
8.3
8.9
9.2
10.3
10.6
11.1
13.2
5.3
9.1

DE BREVITATE VITAE
Nothing is above him who lS above Portune.
By de1)end:tng on the morrow and wastinr:r today· one
attempts to dispose of what Fortune governs and not
what he himself governs.
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AD POLYBIUM D:2 CONSOLATIONE

9.4
14.2
16.5

18.3
5.4
5.4
17.5

Fortune-rs fickle and shifts its favors.
Fortune afflicts all with death.
Nothine; is sacred to Fortune. She touches all with
the hand of death.
Fortune provides many e;ood things.
AD Hb""LVIAlY1 Dn CONSOLATI01'E
Seneca never trusted Fortune even when it offered
peace: blessinr:rs, ~noney, influence.
No one is crushed by Portune who is not first deceived by her smiles.
Philosophy alone can save :;::elvia from the onslaught
of }'ortune.
DE BENEFIC IIS
r0.ay e;ive ym cities, but do not be proud.
is very rarely judicious.
can buy and sell the body, but not man's m1nd.
modifies t~e issue of even the best plans.
places kings in t-neir hlgh posi tioLs.

2.16.2
2.28.2
3.20.2
5.2.2
5.4.2

F'ortune
Fortune
:F'ortune
Fortune
Fortune

4.7

No man is so far advanced by Fortune that he is not
threatened as greatly as he has been aided.
It is noble to be contented and not deoendent on
Fortune.
When :Fortune is kind, we must fortify ourselves
against her violence.
f:;ecuri ty does not depend on Fortune.
Fortune has no jurisdiction over character.
Portune alone often keeps cruel and ambitious ':1en
from- attemntins the very worst deeds.
S:he. soul alor1e render us noble and rises above
Fortune.
V,'hat l''ortune has not given (peace of mind), she can
not take away.
Fortune takes away friends, but she also gives them.
!J.'he wise man overcomes Fortune by his virtues.
l<1 ortune gives us nothing we can own.
Anyone who deems t"'1ings other t~1an virtue to be good
puts ~1.imself in the :90!~er of Portune.
.
There is no wall that 1' ortune can:aot ta1.::e 'Jy storm;'
so st.rene;then the inner defences of the soul.
He is the richest to whom }'ortune gave not-,li.ng.
Portune cannot hurt one protected by philosophy • .She
can only seize one who clings to her.
T:'l.e brave man(wise man) fears not death, burning, imprisonment, and other missiles of F'ortune. He just
takes them as ..nart of existence.

EPISTULAE MORALE;:,

15.9
18.6
18.7
36.6
42.4
44.5

59.18
63.7
71.:30
72.7
74.6
74.19

81.31
82.5
85.26

.
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91.2
91.4
92.2
98.2
99.22
104.22
110.2

EPISTULAE LORALES
Fortune generally allovvs men when assailing t 11.em collectively to have a forebod~_ng of t~1.e suffering to
come.
1,'J1lat is there that Fortune does not drag down from
prosperity, the more violently the more brilliant j_ t
happens to be.
Perfect reason alone can stand firm against Portune.
Fortune gives us neit~er good nor evil, but only the
raw material for these.
Fortune lets man go(to deatcl) 'iiVhen she sees fit.
The only safe harbor is a readiness to receive Pertune's missiles, neither skulking nor turning bacl{.
Are we under guardianship of t··1e ?,ods or consigned
to .Portune?
SECTION D
GOD

1.6
4 •.5

4.7
5.9
6.6

8.2
1.1.4
1.7.2

DE PROVIDENTIA
A tie of likeness exists between God and man. The
only difference ls one of time. \';ian is god's offspring; God tests a good man.
God favors those w'wm he gives a chance to do the
courageous and the brave deeds.
God disciplines those whom he loves.
v~11.atever ordains us to live and die also bin.ds the
gods. Creator of the world made Fate, yet he follows
its decrees.
IVlan outstrips God in that he is superior to evil.
God is just exempt from it.
DE C O:::JSTANTIA
The wise man IS llle tne gods in all save irrnnortali ty.
DE CLB]v;ENTIA
If the immortalgods require a reclconing from me, I
am ready.
Nero is to be ju.st ·and merciful as t'1e gods are.

2.30.2

DE IHA .
Man alone comprehends J-od and imitates him.
The divlne Dlan operates in the laws of Nature. The
immortal gods neither wish to nor are able to hurt us
You waste time in praying God for something.

12.4

AD MARC IAM DE C ONSOLi\TIOHE
Even divinities can-perish in death.

2.16.3
2.26.2

So stories tell
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19.5
2.5.1-3
26.6
17.1

6.8
8.3

4.2

19.1

8.4
16.1-2
20.5

1.1.9
2.29.2
2.29.4
2.30.1
3.6.2
3.17.3
3.28.2
4.3.2
4.5.1
4.6.1-5
4.7.1-2
4.8.1-3

AD IvlARC IA~2: DE CONSOLATIONE
Fortuneca.._rmot holdviThat Nature has let go.
The soul appears to be immortal. So God is immortal.
God destroys the earth in cycles.
AD POLY'Bimii DE CONSOLA'l'IONE
Former great men are enrolled as gods.
them in adversity.

Let us imi tat

AD HEINIAlV1 DE C OJ~SOLATIOhE
The planets whirl about by the inviolable law of
Nature. God's nature finds delight in speedy motion.
Vvbat j_s the great creator? God? Reason, Spirit, or
Pate?
DE OTIO
Did God create many systems? v'v'l"lat is the nature of
God? Does he encompass his works wit.lin or without?
DE 5REVITA1'E VITAE
It is more important to know 'i'f'::lat shape and substance
Jod has and what Natv.re has in store for the soul
freed from the body than to be concerned with worldly
things.
DS Vri'A BEATA
God is called-rhe-wDrld.
You assume likeness to God in beinr.; virtuous.
The gods are the rulers of tne world. They are the
censors of deeds and words.
DE BENEPICIIS
The immortal gods are beneficent even to evil men.
We are below the gods. People say the gods neglect
us when Nature does not let certain qualities exist
in the same person.
Our Father has bestowed benefits and blessings on us.
We receive our existence from the gods.
The gods give judgment.
F'ear the gods who witness all ingratitude.
'lne world is the parent of us all.
If giving is only to seek for a return, then the eods
would not give anything.
The gods do hear our prayers and are generous.
God has been extravagant in forming the universe for
us.
God and nature and divine reason are the same. God
is the first of a chain of cat;.ses. Any na.'."'le can
stand for God if it connotes force.
Nature, Fate, J:i'ortune, and God are the same. All
powers will return into primal fire.
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4.18.3
4.23.4
4.25.1-3
4.28.3
4.31-32
5.17.7
5.25.4
6.22.1
6.23.6
7.3.2
7.7.4
7.1.7

9.16
12.10
12.10
16.5-6
17.6
18.13
31.8
31.10
31.10
41.1
41.3
44.1
53.11
58.28
65.12
65.19

DE Br.N ID' IC I IS
God gives manreason and fellowship with himself.
The stars are called gods.
Good is done to us by the gods without their seeking
for any advantage.
Certain gifts God bestows on all human beings.
Gods show indulgence to some because of their ancestry.
God thought me worthy of this set of benefits.
We ask for·help from the gods by prayers; but they do
not hear us.
The gods act under no external constraint. They are
heavenly bodies.
Our interests are the concern of the gods. Nature
created us. Tnere was design in the creation of man.
Men alone have intellects.
1
fhe irmnortal gods rule without arms from on high.
God suffers no harm because of his divine nature.
'rhat person has perfect knowledge of the useful and
essential who knovvs he has nothing to fear from God
or :':lan.,

EPISTULAE lv:OMLE~
Juppiter returns within himself w!wn Nature and the
heavens are in the process of di_ssolution.
God bestows the number of days of life.
We should thank God for freedom to end life.
If God is the arbiter of t11e universe, obey him; if
chance, endure it.
There is true liberty in study ng philosophy. No
longer will God or man be feared.
He alone is worthy of God who scorns riches.
Have a plan of life wah a knowlede;e of things human
and divine. 'rhis makes one an associate of the gods
and not their suppliant.
No one has knowledge of God.
God is t1e highest and :rrJ.ost powerful. 'l']le soul is a
god dwelling within us.
God dwells within us. God is a spirit marki11g our
good and evil deeds.
The beauty of nature indicates God's existence.
All men spring from the gods.
Study philosophy and you will differ from the gods
only in t~at they live longer.
We are weak, so let us turn our minds to what is
eternal, namely God, who protects and ~overns all.
The first cause is simple because natter is simple.
The first cause is creative reason or God.
Seneca asks r'netorical questions as to whether he
should inquire into the nature of the 11 artifex mundi .'
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65.23.
71.13
71.16
73.6
73.13
74.14
74.16
74.20
75.17
76.23
77.12
82.1
83.1
87.19
90.29
90.29
92.1
92.7
92.27
92.30
93.3
95.36
95.48
95.52
96.2
107.9
110.1

EPISTULAE JviORALES
God and matter exist. God controls matter.
All thin3s are subject to change, althoug.."l God controls them.
Great souls should comply with God's wishes and suffer
what the law of t'1e universe ordains.
A god controls the seasons.
A wise man is most happy, even as the gods.
Lust, banquets, etc. do not pertain to God.
Is anything good in which man surpasses God'l
Let man be pleased at whatever pleases God.
Gods are not powers of evil since they are all-good
and thus cannot harm anyone.
The good man has the highest sense of duty to t'l.e
gods. Good men know that all happens by the divine
law.
The divine decrees are unalterable.
A god will be Lucilius' sponsor. This god is a soul
that loves right and goodness.
Nothing is hidden from the sight of god.
That produces a wi.s e rr1an which produces a god, i.e.,
a perfect reason and conformity to Nature.
Wisdom discloses, what the temple of the gods is; it
also tells what the gods are.
Viisdom takes us back to eternal Reason, the beginning
of all things., and the force inhering in seeds of
all things.
The dlvine Reason is in command of all things; our
reason is the same becal1 Se it is derived from the
divine reason.
Human beinr;s are .3econd only to the gods.
Reason is perfect in the gods. In us it is "perfectible.u
Man is from God and will return to participate in
divinity. The universe is God and we are his members
and associates.
None deal fairly with the gods. We rail at Fate, ~ut
is it not fairer that we obey Nature rat[ler than it
obey us?
The immortal gods were born with goodness as part of
their nature.
~Ian never makes progress until he has the right idea
of God. Believe God exists, is supreme, and punishes
We are all parts of one body(includes god and man).
Nature created us from the same source and for the
same end.
Seneca not only obeys God, but agrees with him.
Do not carp at Nature for what ha-cpens, but accompany
the god under whose guidance all progresses.
Are we consigned to guard:tans or left to Fortune?
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EPI:ST:TLAE Iv,ORA.LES

110.10
113.16
117.6
117.24
119.15
120.14
124.14
124.14
124.23

God, our :F'ath.er, has given us all t::1ings for our own
good.
God the creator gives infinite variety.
All infer the gods exist because everyone has an idea
of the deity.
If you wish to live, pray to the gods for health. If
you wish to die, ignore the gods and end your life.
The builder of the-universe provided that we should
live in well being, bu.t not in luxury.
A virtuous man has developed his soul's capabilities
until he is inferior only to God from whom a part
flows into man.
There ar>e four natures: tree, animal, man, God. Man
and God are of the same· nature. God is imrn.ortal, hut
not so man.
That is perfect which is accordinp; to nature as a
whole. Nature has reason.
!'.-Ian is on a level with God when he possesses perfect
reason.
SECTION E
SENECA CALLS HIMSELF A sroiC

De Otio 1.4
De Otio 2.1
De Otio 6.4
De Otio 8.1
De Ira 2.19.3
De Beneficiis 2.31.1
De Beneficiis 2.35.2
De Beneficiis 4.2.1
De Beneficiis 4.8.1
De Beneficiis 5.12.5
Epistulae Morales 13.4
Epistulae Morales 33.3-4
Epistulae Morales 59.1
Epistulae Morales 65.2
Epistulae Morales 68.2
Epistulae Morales 71.6
Epistulae Morales 74.23
Epistulae Morales 82.19
Epistulae Morales 87.26
Epistulae Morales 89.8
Epistulae Morales 99.26-27
Epistulae Morales 116.1
Epistulae Morales 117.2
Epistulae Morales 124.2
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